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Probability, Confidence, and the
Constitutionality of Summary Judgment
by LUKE MEIER*
Introduction
Professor Suja Thomas has famously argued that federal
summary judgment is unconstitutional under the provisions in the
Seventh Amendment protecting a civil litigant's right to a jury trial.'
Employing the historical approach required under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence interpreting the Seventh Amendment,2 Professor
Thomas concludes that "no procedure similar to summary judgment
existed under the English common law" and that "summary judgment
violates the core principles or 'substance' of the English common
law.",3  Unfortunately, Professor Thomas has swept too broadly in
* Professor of Law, Baylor Law School. J.D., University of Texas School of Law. B.S.
Kansas State University. This paper is part of a larger project that has benefited from the
feedback of numerous individuals deserving of thanks: Kevin Clermont, Ken Klein, Jill
Lens, Clyde Martin, Charles Nesson, Gerry Powell, Rory Ryan, Larry Solum, Jeff
Stempel, Peter Tillers, Maggie Wittlin, Jim Wren, Richard Wright. I am also grateful for
the research help provided by the following individuals: Ryan Jamison, Erin Hamilton,
Emily Oglesby, Andrea Palmer, and Kim Pearson. All errors are mine.
1. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139 (2007).
2. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) (both stating that the parameters of the right to jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment are determined by English common law practice as it
existed in 1791 at the time of the Seventh Amendment's adoption). But see Margaret L.
Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 187-92 (2000) (questioning the validity of the
current approach for determining the parameters of the Seventh Amendment).
3. Thomas, supra note 1, at 139-40; see generally, Suja Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1667 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, The Unconstitutionality of Summary Judgment: A
Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1613 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment,
Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687 (2004) (all
discussing the constitutionality of summary judgment).
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reaching this conclusion; she fails to recognize that not all summary
judgments are created equal.
To appreciate this point, it is necessary to delineate between the
concepts of probability and confidence as they pertain to disputed
questions of fact in the context of litigation. In my article Probability,
Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Standard, I explore this issue
in depth.4 Stated simply, the probability inquiry requires an estimate
as to the likelihood of a given fact being true; the confidence inquiry
asks how sure one can be about a probability estimate given the
information available. Generally speaking, the more evidence one
has regarding an unknown fact the more confident one can be in a
probability estimate of a given fact from that evidence
In concluding that summary judgment is unconstitutional,
Professor Thomas has assumed that courts always decide summary
judgment by replicating the probability analysis performed by the
jury at trial.6 To be sure, this is sometimes the basis for a court's grant
of summary judgment. When a trial court judge examines the
summary judgment record and concludes that a party's evidence on a
necessary fact has so little probative value that a jury would not be
reasonable in concluding that the party has met its burden of
persuasion on this fact, the trial court has granted a summary
judgment based on a probability analysis. For summary judgments
that are based on this probability analysis, Professor Thomas's
historical research and conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
summary judgment are well argued and cogent.
The problem with Professor's Thomas's ultimate conclusion
regarding summary judgment, however, is that she fails to account for
the reality that federal courts often grant summary judgment
according to a confidence theory rather than a probability theory. In
these instances, a court grants summary judgment because the state of
the record is such that there would be insufficient confidence in any
probability conclusion to be drawn from the record. The dearth of
evidence is held against the party with the burden of production,
4. See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Standard
(forthcoming 2014).
5. See id.
6. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 158-59 (describing modern summary judgment
practice as requiring the judge to make inferences from the evidence and as invading the
province of the jury to determine the fact).
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which is usually on the plaintiff.' Thus, when a plaintiff cannot
produce a sufficient amount of evidence on a disputed question of
fact, she has failed to satisfy her burden and is thus thrown out on
summary judgment. This judgment against the plaintiff occurs even if
the plaintiff's version of the disputed, material facts to the litigation
appears more likely (based on the scant summary judgment record)
than the defendant's version. Hence, when a court enters summary
judgment pursuant to a confidence analysis, the judge has not
engaged in the probability inquiry that raises the constitutional
concerns addressed by Professor Thomas. Instead, the trial court
judge has made a sophisticated legal and policy judgment about the
state of the evidentiary record and the costs and benefits of asking the
jury to assess probability without better information.
Professor Thomas is not alone in failing to distinguish between
the concepts of probability and confidence. Legal doctrine, in
general, has failed to adequately account for these two different
theories of summary judgment, a phenomenon best explained by the
"reasonable jury" gloss on the language of Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.8 Failing to distinguish between probability
and confidence has dramatic consequences for the widespread
conclusions offered by Professor Thomas regarding the
constitutionality of summary judgment. Once one distinguishes
between the concepts of probability and confidence, it becomes
obvious that summary judgment is constitutional when it is entered
according to a confidence theory.
This conclusion is confirmed, first, under an historical analysis.
Under English common law, judges could enter an involuntary
nonsuit against the plaintiff when the evidentiary record was lacking
with regard to a material fact.' The use of a confidence theory within
this English common law procedure confirms the constitutionality of
its use in a modern summary judgment setting.
Second, a confidence analysis is analytically similar to other
functions performed by a trial court judge that do not raise Seventh
Amendment concerns. A judge employing a confidence analysis is
actually performing an analytical task that closely replicates that of an
7. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5122 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that the burden of production is
usually on the plaintiff).
8. See Meier, supra note 4 (explaining how the reasonable jury standard makes it
difficult to discern the distinct concepts of probability and confidence).
9. See infra Parts II.A-B.
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evidentiary presumption. More broadly speaking, a judge's analysis
under a confidence theory somewhat equates to the law of evidence.
Neither evidentiary presumptions nor the law of evidence raise
serious Seventh Amendment concerns, however.
Finally, the constitutionality of a confidence theory of summary
judgment is confirmed by existing Supreme Court case law. In both
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States° and Galloway v. United
States," the Supreme Court affirmed a pre-jury judgment that had
been entered pursuant to a confidence theory.2  Scholars have
generally erred in supposing that these two opinions broadly resolve
that summary judgment is always constitutional.3 That said, the
Fidelity and Galloway opinions do support the more limited argument
advanced herein, which is that summary judgment is constitutional
when it is entered pursuant to a confidence theory.
The primary objective of this Article is to demonstrate that
Professor Thomas has erred in broadly proclaiming summary
judgment unconstitutional. Distinguishing between the concepts of
confidence and probability compels this conclusion. Drawing this
distinction between confidence and probability, however, also has the
secondary effect of supporting Professor Thomas's arguments
regarding summary judgment.4 Once one recognizes that Professor
Thomas's constitutional argument is directed at only a probability
theory of summary judgment, her arguments become more powerful.
In particular, the popular notion that the Supreme Court has already
confirmed the constitutionality of summary judgment entered under a
probability theory is wrong.5 A careful inspection of the modern
10. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
11. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
12. See id. at 373; Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 321-22.
13. See infra Section IV.
14. Professor Thomas has also asserted that the modern pleading standard of
plausibility, articulated by the Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), is
unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. See generally Suja A. Thomas, Why the
Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008). Here again,
Professor Thomas has failed to distinguish between the important concepts of probability
and confidence. This error, however, has a more devastating effect on her conclusion
regarding pleading than it does with regard to her conclusion regarding summary
judgment. Here, her conclusion is not just partially wrong (as was the case with summary
judgment); it is completely wrong. See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and
Twombly's "Plausibility" Standard (forthcoming 2015) (explaining why Twombly's
plausibility standard does not violate the Seventh Amendment).
15. See infra note 25.
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Supreme Court case law demonstrates that this conventional wisdom
is inaccurate.
The organization of the Article is as follows: Part I considers the
different theories a modern judge might use in entering summary
judgment. Part 1I examines the constitutionality of a confidence
theory of summary judgment from a historical perspective. Part III
shows how a confidence analysis is analytically similar to the law of
presumptions and the law of evidence. Part IV demonstrates that the
conventional wisdom regarding modern Supreme Court case law on
the Seventh Amendment is incorrect. Part V concludes by calling for
a more extensive academic and judicial consideration of Professor
Thomas's (properly cabined) arguments.
I. The Divergent Uses of Summary Judgment
In a series of law review articles,'6 Professor Thomas has
advocated her broad thesis that modern summary judgment violates
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil litigation in federal
court.7 Thomas's argument proceeds under the rubric of the historic
analysis used by the Supreme Court in determining the parameters of
this constitutional right. According to this historical approach, the
right to a jury trial "preserved" by the Seventh Amendment is the
right to a jury trial that existed under English common law in 1791.18
In a rather mechanical fashion, Professor Thomas compares summary
judgment to various common law procedures that existed under
English common law in 1791: the demurrer to the pleadings, the
demurrer to the evidence, the nonsuit, the special case, and the
motion for a new trial.9
Professor Thomas ultimately concludes that none of these
English common law procedures replicate what occurs under modern
summary judgment.° According to Thomas, any disputed questions
16. See supra note 3.
17. Because the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against state action,
the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to state court litigation. See Martin H.
Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III
Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
407, 436 (1995) (explaining that the Seventh Amendment does not apply in state court
proceedings).
18. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
19. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 148-59.
20. See id. at 158-62.
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of fact had to be resolved by the jury (or the parties") under English
common law in 1791.22 A judge's ability to inject himself into the fact-
finding process was severely limited. If a judge thought the jury had
reached a factual conclusion that was inconsistent with the evidence
submitted at trial, a judge could only order that a new trial be
conducted. Thus, according to Thomas, a judge had no ability to
intervene in the fact-finding process before the jury had reached its
decision.23 The judge's ability to intervene only arose after a jury had
determined the disputed questions of fact, and even at this point the
judge could only order a new trial rather than enter a judgment for a
particular party.24
Professor Thomas's views have been noted by many25 and
sometimes applauded.26  A few commentators have challenged
21. Under a demurrer to the pleadings or a demurrer to the evidence, a defendant
conceded the factual contentions asserted by the plaintiff and in this sense negated the
need for a jury. See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 501 (2d ed.
1947) ("[A demurrer] added no new facts to the case, but in effect said: 'Admitting all you
have alleged, nevertheless you are in law not entitled to a judgment."').
22. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 159-60.
23. See id.
24. See generally id. at 1-61.
25. As of October 16, 2014, Professor Thomas's Virginia Law Review article, in
which she asserts her constitutional argument regarding summary judgment, has been
cited in 102 law reviews.
26. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
522, 526 (2007) ("Thomas's paper deserves the attention it has received, and its arguments
are convincing with respect to history and textual interpretation."); Bradley Scott
Shannon, 91 MARO. L. REV. 815, 834 n.107 (2008) (citing Thomas favorably). It is
somewhat surprising that most scholars have simply noted Thomas's views but refused to
weigh in on the debate. This reaction might be a product of the belief that, despite the
merits of Thomas's argument, the Supreme Court has resolved the issue. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100
YALE L.J. 73, 76 n.18 (1990); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
"Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1074-132 (2003) (both stating
that the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of summary judgment); see also
McDaniel v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 311 Fed. App'x. 758 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding
that Thomas's argument "lacks merit" because the Supreme Court had already
determined that summary judgment is constitutional). The constitutionality of summary
judgment was widely presumed by lower federal courts before Thomas's article. See 10A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2714 n.7 (3d
ed. 2012) (listing cases in which the constitutionality of summary judgment under Rule 56
is presumed). Professor Thomas acknowledges the "uniform acceptance" of summary
judgment and that the procedure is "well-entrenched in our federal courts through its
ubiquity and lengthy history." See Thomas, supra note 1, at 140. Nevertheless, Professor
Thomas argues that the Supreme Court precedent from which the constitutionality of
summary judgment is presumed has been misread and interpreted too broadly. See id. at
163-77. On this point, I find myself in agreement with Professor Thomas. If the Supreme
[Vol. 42:1
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Thomas's thesis, but in a somewhat gentle manner that presumes
many of the assumptions on which her overall argument is based.27
For instance, Professor Edward Brunet2' asserts that Professor
Thomas should be "commended,29 for her arguments and that
summary judgment "raises serious constitutional questions."30
Moreover, Brunet's arguments-like Thomas's-are historically
based, although Brunet rejects Thomas's "static and inflexible
reading of the historical test [required by the Seventh
Amendment].31  Despite this common ground, Brunet ultimately
concludes that Thomas's conclusion regarding summary judgment is
wrong because modern summary judgment is functionally equivalent
to the common law procedure of a trial by inspection, a procedure not
considered by Professor Thomas.2 Under a trial by inspection, a trial
judge was able to decide obvious factual issues without having to
submit them to a jury.33 Because this common law procedure is
roughly equivalent to modern summary judgment practice, Brunet
Court was convinced regarding the merits of Professor Thomas's argument, I have no
doubt that the Court would not feel constrained by stare decisis to nevertheless uphold the
constitutionality of summary judgment. One way or another, considering what is at stake,
the substance of Professor Thomas's argument eventually deserves a thorough and
complete disposition by the Supreme Court, and that clearly has not occurred up to this
point.
27. There are exceptions. Professor William Nelson, for instance, has argued that
modern summary judgment is constitutional by rejecting the historical approach to the
Seventh Amendment on the view that constitutional law should not be "mired in the
past." See William E. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1653, 1653-54 (2008). Professor Brian Fitzpatrick has questioned whether
Thomas's mechanical historical analysis is truly sufficient to satisfy the "originalist
methodology" on which her argument is based. See Brian Fitzpatrick, Originalism and
Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 925-26 (2010) (explaining that the inquiry
should not be whether a jury decided factual issues in 1791, but rather the reason why this
process existed and whether these reasons justify a conclusion that this process was
constitutionally required).
28. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625
(2008).
29. Id. at 1628.
30. Id. at 1627.
31. Id. at 1629-30.
32. Professor Brunet, in an almost off-hand comment, makes the more
straightforward (but, in my opinion, more important) critique of Thomas when he states
that "it is overly broad for Professor Thomas to suggest boldly that summary judgment is
always unconstitutional; there are many instances where summary judgment passes
constitutional muster .... [J]udges may constitutionally grant summary judgment based
upon [] legal principles.., because they have been doing so for several centuries." Id. at
1628. I will explore this point, in more detail, in Part III of this Article.
33. Id. at 1631.
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concludes that summary judgment is constitutional,34 particularly
under the flexible and pragmatic version of the historical test that
Brunet advocates in his article.5
Professor Thomas's conclusion regarding summary judgment is
susceptible to a more fundamental criticism than what has been
offered to this point. In particular, Professor Thomas's constitutional
argument against summary judgment is based on an inaccurate view
as to the analysis a judge performs when considering a summary
judgment motion. Professor Thomas assumes that judges always
decide summary judgment by assessing the summary judgment record
and then considering the probability (likelihood) of the material facts
to the litigation.36 In reality, this is only one of the three different
types of analyses a judge might perform in determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate. These analyses include: (A)
Probability; (B) Legal; and (C) Confidence. Each of these analyses is
discussed below.
A. Evidence to Facts: The Judge's Probability Analysis
To help demonstrate the different types of analyses a judge




Figure A attempts to roughly depict the manner in which disputes are
resolved through litigation. Obviously, the end result of any dispute
resolution process must be the law, which is depicted by the box on
the right side of Figure A. In order to apply the law to a dispute,
however, the facts of the dispute must be determined. The middle
box represents the facts, and the arrow linking the facts to the law
34. Id. at 1640-41.
35. See generally id. at 1642-51. Professor Thomas has responded to Professor
Brunet's argument by noting the limited issues that could be resolved through a trial by
inspection and by suggesting that the modern concept of judicial notice is the true analog
to the common law trial by inspection. See Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still
Unconstitutional, supra note 3, at 1672-77.
36. See supra note 6.
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represents the process of applying the law to the facts of a particular
case. The facts of a particular case are often disputed, however.
When this occurs, it is necessary to resolve which of the parties'
contrasting views of the facts is correct. This, of course, will be done
through evidence, which is represented by the box to the left of
Figure A. The arrow linking the evidence box to the facts box
represents the process of determining the facts of a particular case
from the evidence.
Figure A shows the basic relationship between evidence, facts,
and the law but reveals nothing about the particular process by which
the facts are determined from the evidence and the law is applied to
the facts. The basics of this process, however, are familiar enough.
For the most part, it is the duty of the judge to determine the law and
to apply the law to the facts of a particular case. Similarly, it is
primarily the jury which is given the task of considering the evidence
and making a determination as to the facts of a particular dispute. In
most instances, the jury will not know with absolute certainty, from
the evidence adduced at trial, what actually happened at the previous
point in time that is the focus of the trial. In other words, the jury will
often view both the plaintiff and the defendant's versions of the
disputed facts to the litigation as being possible. In this situation, the
legal system-through the judge's instruction to the jury on the
burden of persuasion-tells the jury how to proceed. Normally, the
governing burden of persuasion for civil litigation is the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. Under this standard, the
jury is asked which of the competing versions of the facts is more
likely. If the plaintiff's version is more likely, then the plaintiff should
recover, even if the jury believes there is a 49% chance that the
plaintiff's version of the facts is inaccurate. It is clear, then, that a
jury's involvement in determining facts from the evidence involves a
probability analysis. Under a probability analysis, the jury is to
determine-from the evidence adduced at trial-the likelihood that
the plaintiff's version of the facts is accurate.
In addition to the jury's probability analysis, federal judges are
also expected37 to perform a probability analysis in determining
whether to grant summary judgment in a particular case. In
37. This probability analysis has been required since the Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and maybe even before that
decision. See Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Standard, supra
note 4 (suggesting that courts employed a probability analysis as part of summary
judgment well before the Anderson case).
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,38 the Court held that a judge's
decision regarding summary judgment is to be governed by the
"reasonable jury" standard.9  Under this standard, a judge
determines whether summary judgment is appropriate by
determining whether a jury would be reasonable in resolving the facts
in favor of either party from the evidence available on the record.4"
By defining a judge's analysis at summary judgment through
reference to the jury's analysis at trial, the "reasonable jury" standard
necessarily requires a judge to engage in a probability analysis. This
is because a jury must engage in a probability analysis and a judge
cannot be expected to know whether a jury would be reasonable in
performing this probability analysis unless the judge considers the
probability issue.
Even though a judge must consider the probability question in
determining a summary judgment, a judge does not simply weigh the
evidence and come to her own specific conclusion as to probability
from the evidence. Although this type of precision is expected from
the jury, the judge's analysis of probability at the summary judgment
stage is different. In other words, the judge is not supposed to decide
the probability question, but rather, determine simply whether a
decision by the jury is necessary. Essentially, a judge's task with
regard to probability is to determine the range of probability
conclusions that constitute a "reasonable" probability conclusion
from the record evidence. In this sense, the judge is not replicating
the jury's analysis of probability, but rather, acting as a gatekeeper to
eliminate the necessity of empanelling a jury when a reasonable jury
could only decide the case in one way.
38. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242.
39. The Supreme Court had arguably gravitated towards the reasonable jury
interpretation of Rule 56 in prior cases. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984); Bill Johnson's Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 741 (1983); TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); William Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the
Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 481 (1983) ("A
[dispute over] an issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree.").
40. Technically, the standard a judge applies is to determine whether a jury would be
reasonable in finding the facts in favor of the "nonmovant"-that is, the party resisting
summary judgment. In many instances, of course, a judge will have to determine cross-
motions for summary judgment, and in this instance the articulation of the test in the text
is technically accurate. When only one party has moved for summary judgment, the test
cited in the text is not technically accurate, but if only one party has elected not to move
for summary judgment it is a safe assumption that it is because the opponent's version of
the facts is reasonable, given the evidence. In any event, my decision to eliminate the
somewhat confusing term "nonmovant" is done with an aim towards clarity, even if this
clarity is achieved at the expense of the technicalities addressed in this footnote.
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Any time a judge concludes that a jury could not reasonably find
the facts in favor of one party to the litigation, and thus enters
summary judgment, a judge has, in essence, preempted the fact-
finding role usually reserved for the jury. And although the judge's
role is-theoretically speaking-simply to act as a gatekeeper, the
line between "gatekeeper" and "decider" is a slippery one. As
Professor Ellen Sward has aptly stated: "[W]hat is 'reasonable' is
often in the eyes of the beholder, meaning that the [reasonable jury]
test gives judges more power.",
4'
This power of a judge to consider the evidence and potentially
resolve the case based on a probability analysis of the facts is clearly
the basis of Professor Thomas's constitutional attack on summary
judgment. Under the common law, according to Thomas, a judge
"never decided the case without such a [factual] determination by the
jury or the parties, however improbable the evidence might be. 42 In
any case in which the facts were disputed, according to Thomas, the
jury would be required to assess the evidence and determine which
party's version of the facts was more probable: "Whether probable or
not [was] for a jury to decide.43 A judge did have power to assert
himself into the probability question after the jury had reached a
conclusion that the court viewed as against the weight of the
evidence, but the judge's power was simply to order a new jury rather
than to decide the case according to the judge's own views of the
evidence." However, according to Thomas, a judge deciding a
modern motion for summary judgment does engage in an inquiry as
to the likelihood of the disputed facts from the record evidence:
"Upon a motion for summary judgment.., the parties disagree on
what their evidence demonstrates. The court must resolve this
difference and decide what the evidence could show.45 Because a
judge deciding a modern summary judgment motion can engage in a
probability analysis that, according to Thomas, was not permitted
under the common law, the modern summary judgment runs afoul of
the right to a jury trial protected by the Seventh Amendment.
41. Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33
SET. HALL L. REV. 573, 575 (2003).
42. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 143.
43. Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (K.B.) 88.
44. It appears that a judge's ability to order a new trial could only be exercised twice.
See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-
AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 13 (2006) ("[A new trial] could occur when there had already
been one or two new trials").
45. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 161-62.
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I do not mean to quarrel with Professor Thomas's conclusion
with regard to the particular type of summary judgment motion she is
considering. Other well-known and respected jurists have questioned
the constitutionality of a judge deciding a case based on the judge's
own view of what facts are probable from a particular evidentiary
record.46 In addition, Professor Thomas's historical research appears
to be thorough.
The problem, though, is that Professor Thomas has failed to consider
the two others analyses a judge might use in determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate or not.
B. Facts to Law: The Judge's Legal Analysis
Although judges sometimes grant summary judgment according
to the probability analysis assumed by Professor Thomas, judges
frequently grant summary judgment under a completely different
theory. This point can be made by returning to Figure A, which is
reproduced below:
Evidence Facts -- 1 Law
Figure A
Professor Thomas's constitutional arguments presume a
summary judgment based on the judge's view as to whether certain
facts can be deduced from particular evidence. In other words, the
type of summary judgment motion that Professor Thomas attacks is
one that occurs in the process of deducing facts from evidence, a
process that is depicted by the arrow on the left side of the page
between the evidence and facts boxes. This type of summary
judgment motion ultimately rests on the determination of the factual
dispute between the parties.
However, judges frequently use summary judgment as a
mechanism for resolving a case based on legal conclusions rather than
46. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that summary judgment rests on
a "tenuous constitutional foundation"); Jack Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment:
Has There Been a Material Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 771 (1988)
(considering whether the Seventh Amendment imposes some limitations on a judge's
ability to grant summary judgment).
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factual determinations: "[W]hen the only question is what legal
conclusions are to be drawn from an established set of facts, the entry
of summary judgment usually should be directed."7 In other words,
summary judgment is frequently used as a mechanism for a judge to
resolve a case based on the right side of Figure A, in determining the
relationship (represented by the arrow) between facts and law. Of
course, if the parties are in complete agreement regarding the facts of
a dispute at the outset of the litigation, this process of applying facts-
to-law can occur at the pleadings stage through either a Motion to
Dismiss or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings." Such clarity,
however, is not always possible at the outset of a dispute and the
parties might not agree on the facts at this early stage; thus, it is
important that summary judgment be available not just as a
mechanism for testing the evidentiary foundation of disputed facts
(the left side of Figure A) but also as a way in which the law can be
brought to bear on the facts to which the parties-after the benefit of
discovery-now agree (the right side of Figure A). 9
While Professor Thomas has arguably demonstrated that the
lack of historical precedent for the type of summary judgment she
considers-one based on the probability of disputed facts from a
particular evidentiary record-there is no question that there is
historical precedent for summary judgments based on the application
of law to a undisputed set of facts. Often, Judges under the English
common law resolved cases without a jury when the only issue in the
case was how the law applied to an agreed set of facts."
47 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, at § 2725.
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(e).
49. In addition to the parties agreeing on the facts of the case, a judge might reach
the conclusion that the material facts are not in dispute and that a legal resolution is
necessary based on the analysis emphasized by Professor Thomas. A judge might
conclude that a certain factual record must be assumed because the evidence supports
only one view of the facts. The parties might still disagree, however, as to how the law
applies to the facts the judge believes should be assumed from this evidentiary record.
Thus, a particular summary judgment motion might require a judge to engage in both
types of analyses (evidence to facts (the left side of Figure A) and facts to law (the right
side of Figure A)), depending on the context of the dispute and the arguments of the
litigants. In the text of this Article, however, I have considered the scenario where the
parties agree on the relevant facts so as to more clearly delineate the different types of
analyses that a judge might have to engage in when ruling on a summary judgment motion.
50. Under both a demurrer to the pleadings and a demurrer to the evidence, a party
could stipulate to the facts in dispute and request a judgment on these disputed facts. See
generally Thomas, supra note 1, at 148-54 (discussing both). By making this stipulation
the party gave up the ability to later contest he facts of the case. In this sense, then, both
of these procedural mechanisms differed from the modern motion to dismiss or motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which allow a party to seek a legal judgment on the opposing
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The notion that summary judgment can be used as a vehicle to
resolve disputes over how the law applies to an agreed set of facts is
not controversial; yet this obvious point reveals a fundamental defect
in the broad conclusion that Professor Thomas asserts as her thesis,
which is that modern summary judgment is always unconstitutional.
Even if Professor Thomas's historical argument is valid, it only
undermines a certain type of summary judgment." The
constitutionality of a judge using summary judgment to resolve how
the law should apply to an agreed set of facts is not unconstitutional,
and this particular point cannot be seriously debated.
C. Evidence to Facts: The Judge's Confidence Analysis
The rather obvious critique of Thomas's thesis2 offered in the
previous section provides an analytical roadmap for the less obvious
and more nuanced criticism offered in this section. The depiction in
Figure A is again helpful in making this point:
Evidence Facts Law
Figure A
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that a judge might
grant summary judgment based upon a legal analysis of agreed-upon
facts (represented by the arrow linking the fact box and the law box).
Professor Thomas presumes, however, that a judge's grant of
summary judgment is based on the process of linking the evidence to
party's version of the facts but also preserves that party's right to contest the facts of the
case.
51. There is an interesting issue as to whether the acceptance of Professor Thomas's
constitutional thesis for the probability type of summary judgment requires that facial
invalidity of the entire rule, thus eliminating the constitutional applications of the rule.
See generally Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557,
1557-72 (2010) (discussing the facial invalidity question in the context of constitutional
challenges to congressional statutes). Before reaching this question, though, a court that
was convinced by Professor Thomas's constitutional argument regarding a probability
theory of summary judgment would have to resolve whether this unconstitutional
procedure is even warranted under the language of Rule 56. I plan to address this
question in future scholarship.
52. Professor Brunet has also offered this critique of Professor Thomas's thesis. See
Brunet, supra note 28.
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the facts (represented by the arrow linking the fact box to the law
box). In reality, however, even the process of linking evidence to
facts (the left side of the chart) is more complex than what is
suggested by Professor Thomas. Professor Thomas assumes that a
judge's involvement in the evidence-to-facts process i  solely based on
a probability analysis. In other words, a judge considers the probative
value of the record evidence and then makes a decision concerning
the likelihood of the disputed facts to the litigation. In reality,
however, there is an additional analysis a judge must consider, at the
summary judgment stage, as part of the process of linking evidence to
facts. This analysis will be termed a confidence analysis. Figure B,
below, depicts this additional analysis.
~~ence Probability FatEvid e tofdjc Facts Law I
Figure B
The contours of a judge's confidence analysis at summary
judgment are fully explored in my article Probability, Confidence, and
the "Reasonable Jury" Standard,53 so I will engage in only a brief
exposition of the principle here. The confidence analysis is best
illustrated by Professor Laurence Tribe's famous blue bus
hypothetical:
Consider next the cases in which the identity of the
responsible agent is in doubt. Plaintiff is negligently
run down by a blue bus. The question is whether the
bus belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff is prepared to
prove that defendant operates four-fifths of all the
blue buses in town. What effect, if any, should such
proof be given?
54
Almost all who have considered the blue bus hypothetical agree that
this case would-and should-result in a judgment for the defendant
53. See Meier, supra note 4.
54. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1341 n.37 (1971) (calling the blue bus hypothetical a
"famous chestnut").
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before the case reaches a jury.5 Yet this result cannot be explained
using either of the two analyses-probability and legal-considered
above. In terms of the probability relationship between the evidence
and the facts, the only evidence available in the case suggests that the
plaintiff's version of the facts (that it was the defendant's bus that
negligently ran down the plaintiff) is, most likely, correct. So, under a
probability analysis, the defendant is clearly not entitled to a
summary judgment. Indeed, it is more likely that the plaintiff would
be entitled to summary judgment under a probability analysis because
a jury would be unreasonable-based on this scant record-in
concluding other than that the plaintiff's version of the events is 80%
likely. Moreover, a judgment for the defendant cannot be explained
through the analysis of applying facts to substantive law: If the
plaintiff's version of the facts is true, there is no doubt that the
defendant's conduct in running down the plaintiff constituted legal
negligence.56
The confidence principle explains why the defendant is entitled
to summary judgment in the blue bus hypothetical, even though the
only available evidence on the disputed question of fact clearly favors
the plaintiff. The real issue in the blue bus hypothetical is not the
probability conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence; rather,
the issue is the degree of confidence in that probability conclusion.
There is so little evidence on the identity of the bus driver that there
is an insufficient degree of confidence in the only probability
conclusion that is reasonable from the record. Resolving the case
based on the scant record amounts to nothing more than a guess. If a
decision must be made under a probability analysis, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the plaintiff must win because the
evidence suggests that the plaintiff's version of events is more
probable than the defendant's. In the blue bus hypothetical, the legal
system concludes that this guess work will not be permitted. Thus,
the plaintiff must lose. The plaintiff loses not because her evidence is
not believable, but because the judge concludes (as a matter of
policy) that the evidence is too scarce."
Of course, any case involving disputed questions of fact will
require a guess-based on after-the-fact evidence-as to what really
happened at that previous point in time. The blue bus hypothetical
55. See Meier, supra note 4.
56. That the defendant's conduct constituted a legal violation is assumed within the
hypothetical.
57. See Meier, supra note 4.
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demonstrates, though, that not all "guesses" are the same. When
there is a sufficient amount of evidence on a disputed question of fact,
the legal system can tolerate the uncertainty that necessarily arises
from trying to recreate any prior event that the litigants dispute. But,
at a certain point, this uncertainty becomes too much.
Determining at what point there is adequate evidence such that a
minimum degree of confidence can be had in the probability
conclusion reached by the jury is a somewhat tricky issue. As I
explain in Probability, Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury"
Standard, this analysis revolves primarily around a decision as to how
much of the potentially available evidence has been presented and
the potential costs of allowing a jury to engage in a probability
analysis on a less-than-complete record.8 The potential costs a judge
must weigh include the need to preserve the integrity of the legal
process and the harm from an erroneous jury decision in favor of the
plaintiff. The substantive law at issue in a particular dispute can
influence the weighing of these considerations.9
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the confidence
decision is a legal one decided on policy grounds. The nature of this
inquiry distinguishes the confidence analysis from the probability
analysis, even though both inquiries concern the relationship of the
evidence to the ultimate facts of the case. Under a probability
analysis, the judge considers the relationship between evidence and
facts by examining the probative value of the evidence with regard to
the disputed questions of fact in the litigation; this analysis is of a
factual nature in that it relates to the ultimate factual question of
"What happened?"6  Under the confidence inquiry, the judge
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Professor Thomas correctly rejects the notion that the nature of the judge's
probability inquiry at summary judgment involves a legal analysis rather than a factual
analysis. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 163. Granted, the "reasonable jury" standard itself
(which requires the judge's consideration of probability) is a legal rule that informs a judge
how to decide a motion for summary judgment. For instance, the legal rule governing
summary judgment could flatly prohibit a judge from any weighing of the probative value
of the evidence. The "reasonable jury" approach reflects a different legal approach, and
in that sense the "reasonable jury" itself can be considered a legal rule. See also Meier,
supra note 4 (describing how the manner in which the reasonable jury rule is applied-
aggressively or liberally-is also a legal question about the legal standard for summary
judgment). That said, the application of this legal standard necessarily requires a judge to
make a decision about what the judge believes the record evidence shows about the
likelihood of the material facts in dispute. There can be no question that the nature of this
probability inquiry is factual. To say that the "reasonable jury" standard does not violate
the Seventh Amendment because it is a legal question rather than a factual inquiry is to
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considers the relationship between evidence and facts from a
different perspective, asking whether there is adequate evidence such
that there will be a sufficient degree of confidence in any probability
conclusion drawn from the record. The confidence analysis is a legal
decision determined by policy considerations.
In comparing the three kinds of analyses for summary judgment,
the nature of the confidence inquiry is actually more similar
analytically to the judge's task of applying facts to law ("legal") than
to the judge's responsibility to act as a gatekeeper on the issue of
probability ("probability"). Obviously, the judge's task of
determining how the law applies to agreed-upon facts is a "legal"
issue. Similarly, the judge's task in determining whether there is a
sufficient amount of evidence to permit the case to proceed to a jury
for a probability analysis is a "legal" question in the sense that the
judge is weighing the policy implications of allowing a jury to resolve
the factual dispute on a sparse evidentiary record. On the other hand,
the judge's task of examining the record evidence to determine
whether a reasonable jury could find for either the plaintiff or the
defendant requires a markedly distinct analysis from the judge. Here,
the judge's inquiry will be controlled primarily by the probative value
the judge assigns to the various pieces of evidence in the record. This
type of analysis essentially replicates the analysis ultimately expected
from the jury at trial, and in this sense the judge's analysis can be
considered as "factual" in nature.
The relationship between the judge's analysis (1) in applying
facts to law, (2) in performing a confidence analysis, and (3) in serving
as a gatekeeper on the probability question, can be depicted in Figure
C, below, which makes clear that the confidence analysis and the
probability analysis are distinct. In Figure C, an analysis that requires
a policy/legal analysis is represented by the dashed line, while an
analysis that is primarily factual in nature is represented by the solid
line. Figure C illustrates that although a judge's analysis of both
confidence and probability at the summary judgment stage requires a
judge to consider the relationship of the evidence produced to the
facts disputed by the litigants, the nature of these two analyses is
confuse the issue with a near-circular game of semantics. Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS 81 (1872) ("'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."'). Thus,
Professor Thomas is correct to reject this potential argument against her thesis. That said,
it is not clear that this argument has been advanced against Professor Thomas's thesis
despite her anticipation that this would be a "popular response" to her constitutional
argument. Thomas, upra note 1, at 163.
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distinct. In actuality, the confidence inquiry is more akin to the
judge's task of applying the law to the facts, even though these two
inquiries require the judge to consider two different relationships
(evidence-to-facts on one hand and facts-to-law on the other).
Probability
Confidence
Eviden Confidenc Facts Law
Figure C
Clearly distinguishing between the different types of analyses a judge
might use at summary judgment is imperative to understanding why
Professor Thomas's broad claim that summary judgment is
unconstitutional cannot be justified. Professor Thomas's arguments
attack only a specific type of analysis-probability analysis-that a
judge might use in granting summary judgment. In reality, however, a
judge might grant summary judgment for reasons other than that
assumed by Professor Thomas. Based on a confidence analysis, a
judge can grant summary judgment, not because she thinks the
evidence is so one-sided, but because there is so little of it. As it turns
out, there is historical support for this particular type of summary
judgment; this issue is explored in the next section.
II. The Constitutionality of a Confidence Theory of Summary
Judgment: Historical Perspective
This section will explore the constitutionality under the Seventh
Amendment of summary judgment decided pursuant to a confidence
theory. An analysis under the Seventh Amendment requires an
historical analysis of English common law; the first two parts of this
section are devoted to this historical analysis. This historical analysis
confirms the constitutionality of this type of analysis. The conclusion
reached in the first two parts of this section is buttressed in the third,
which compares summary judgment under a confidence analysis to
other types of legal rules-clearly constitutional under the Seventh
Amendment-that govern the proof process. The final part of this
section will consider the Supreme Court case law that is potentially
relevant to the constitutionality of the confidence theory of summary
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judgment, concluding that this Supreme Court jurisprudence also
confirms the constitutionality of summary judgment under a
confidence analysis.
A. The Nonsuit
To appreciate that English common law judges could preclude a
plaintiff's recovery61 (pursuant to a confidence theory) when the
evidentiary record was simply too measly,62 it is important to consider
the procedural device known as the nonsuit. A nonsuit could arise in
two different situations: voluntary and compulsory. In a voluntary
nonsuit, the plaintiff failed to appear in court when called and was
thus nonsuited.63 By failing to appear when called, a plaintiff could
effectively withdraw from the case and preserve the ability to
commence a new suit later.64 The modern analog to the voluntary
nonsuit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is Rule 41(a),65
which permits a plaintiff to withdraw a complaint-without
61. To say the judge precluded (or, perhaps more accurately, forestalled) a plaintiff's
recovery is not quite the same as saying that the judge entered judgment against the
plaintiff, as occurs in a modern summary judgment. This difference (which, I believe, is
telling in terms of the nature of the common law nonsuit) is explored infra in Part II.B.2.
62. The reader may have noticed that I have used a variety of adjectives to describe
an evidentiary record that fails to satisfy a confidence analysis. One adjective I have
attempted to avoid is "sufficient," although this is perhaps the best term to capture the
concept involved in a confidence analysis. The term "sufficient" has been avoided
because, although I believe it is often used to verbalize a confidence analysis, it has also
clearly been used to reference a judge's analysis of probability at the summary judgment
stage. Professor Thomas's research is a prime example of the use of the term "sufficient"
to refer to a probability analysis. There is no doubt that Professor Thomas is concerned
with a probability analysis, see supra text at notes 42-45, and she uses the term
"sufficiency" to refer to this analysis. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 155 ("A compulsory
nonsuit could not be ordered, however, upon general assertions regarding the insufficiency
of the plaintiff's evidence.").
63. Although the voluntary nonsuit is sometimes described differently in terms of the
timing and specific process involved, it appears that the best interpretation is that the
plaintiff could achieve this voluntary withdraw at any time up until a verdict was rendered.
Compare 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 346
(1899) (suggesting that the plaintiff could achieve this "withdraw" at any time before the
rendition of a verdict) with Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 300 (1966) (stating that the process of calling the
plaintiff could occur only at the close of the plaintiff's evidence or the close of all of the
evidence) and Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31
HARV. L. REV. 669, 687 (1918) (stating that the "plaintiff might absent himself at the time
of the rendition of the verdict").
64. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at 376 ("[A]fter a nonsuit, which is only a
default, he may commence the same suit again for the same cause of action"); Scott, supra
note 63, at 687.
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
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prejudice-before the defendant has responded to -the plaintiff's
complaint.66 For our purposes, the voluntary nonsuit is obviously is
not relevant to the current discussion because a modern plaintiff does
not consent to a summary judgment.
However, an analysis of the constitutionality of a compulsory
nonsuit is relevant to our discussion about summary judgment. A
nonsuit at common law could also occur without the plaintiff's
consent, however, in the form of an "involuntary" or "compulsory"
nonsuit. The Supreme Court in Coughran v. Bigelow68 generally
66. See id. The wide latitude given the plaintiff under the common law to withdraw
(through a nonsuit) must be considered in light of the fact that no pretrial discovery was
permitted under the common law, meaning that a party's perspective on the case would
often be dramatically altered or shaped by what occurred at trial. See Robert W. Millar,
The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L.
REV. 424, 437, 441 (1936) (discussing the absence of discovery techniques available under
English common law and the effect this had on trials).
67. There appears to be some debate as to whether the compulsory nonsuit was
firmly entrenched throughout English practice by 1791, the relevant date under the
historical approach required under Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Seventh
Amendment. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 376; Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476. The Supreme
Court itself has acknowledged the use of the compulsory nonsuit under English common
law but pegged the growth of this device to the "eighteenth and nineteenth" centuries. See
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391 n.23. Other sources might arguably be read to support the
notion that the compulsory nonsuit was not available under the common law. See Scott,
supra note 63, at 687 (stating that "[a]t common law nonsuits were wholly voluntary" and
that "[s]tatutes have sometimes provided for compulsory nonsuits" but presumably
referring to American statutes dealing with involuntary nonsuits). In any event, and as the
discussion in the text will demonstrate, it seems clear that at least some English courts
were using the involuntary nonsuit by 1791. See also Bacon v. Parker, 2 Tenn. 55, 56
(1809) ("The practice in England and this country differs on this ground. Here, as well as
in North Carolina, in common cases, the Court never compels a nonsuit or gives judgment
to that effect, but with the consent of the party nonsuited. In England, the practice is
understood to be, that the Court will order a judgment of nonsuit to be entered, whenever
it clearly perceives the plaintiff fails in proving his case, supposing his evidence to be true;
or where no evidence is given on his part."); cf Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880)
(stating that, in 1880, an English court could enter a compulsory nonsuit against a
plaintiff). The use by at least some English common law courts of the involuntary nonsuit
by 1791 would appear to make this device a permissible benchmark for determining the
parameters of the Seventh Amendment. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-91 ("Nor were
'the rules of the common law' then prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by
which the judge regulated the jury's role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and
immutable system." (quotes in original)). Indeed, Professor Thomas seems to concede
that the compulsory nonsuit was sufficiently established within English common law
practice to make it relevant to a Seventh Amendment inquiry, as she analyzes the
involuntary nonsuit in reaching her own conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
summary judgment. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 155 n.66. Professors Henderson and
Scott, in their respective (and respected) studies of English common law procedure, also
both include a discussion of the compulsory nonsuit. See Henderson, supra note 63, at
300-01; Scott, supra note 63, at 687.
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Although Professor Thomas does acknowledge the relevance of the compulsory
nonsuit to her historical analysis (Professor Thomas compares the compulsory nonsuit to
modern summary judgment), she seems to discount the importance of the compulsory
nonsuit by stating the compulsory nonsuit was "rare" or "unusual." Thomas, supra note 1,
at 155; Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common
Law, supra note 3, at 724. Thomas's support for this conclusion, though, is puzzling.
Thomas cites Professor James Oldham for the proposition that the compulsory nonsuit
was rare. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 155 n.66. The citation to Oldham, however, is to a
footnote containing nothing but a citation to Professor Henderson's Harvard Law Review
article. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 231 n.35. Professor Henderson, in her article
referenced by Oldham, does not state that a compulsory nonsuit was rare or infrequent
but only that it could be obtained "by a slightly more circuitous route" than the voluntary
nonsuit. See Henderson, supra note 63, at 300. Even more problematic for Professor
Thomas, though, is that Professor Oldham-in the very book that Thomas cites as support
for her conclusion that the nonsuit was rare-directly contradicts Thomas's statement:
Oldham comments on the "frequent entry of nonsuit" in the trial notes of Lord Mansfield
regardless of whether the plaintiff had consented to the nonsuit or not. See OLDHAM,
supra note 44, at 10-12. This confusion is unfortunate, because Professor Thomas's
ultimate conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the specific type of summary
judgment she is concerned with is not affected by the frequency with which compulsory
nonsuits were entered. As will be explained in the text, the compulsory nonsuit was
clearly not a procedure by which judges regularly weighed the evidence, found the
plaintiff's factual assertions to be unlikely, and entered judgment.
In any event, I disagree with Professor Thomas's assertion that the nonsuit was rare.
I examined English Reports of the King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas for the
time period preceding (and including) the year 1791, and I came across the procedure
frequently when doing so. I also skimmed Professor Oldham's collection of Lord
Mansfield's trial notes. Recall that these notes formed the basis of Professor Oldham's
statement regarding the "frequent entry of a nonsuit." See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 10.
I concur with Professor Oldham's assessment that the nonsuit was not rare.
There also appears to be some disagreement over the timing of a compulsory
nonsuit. Professor Henderson, in the Harvard Law Review article referenced above, has
stated that the compulsory nonsuit could only be entered after the jury had entered a
verdict against a party. See Henderson, supra note 63, at 300-01 ("If the plaintiff should
somehow obtain a verdict in a case proper for nonsuit, defendant could move, before the
judges en banc, to have the verdict set aside and judgment of nonsuit entered.").
Professor Thomas seems to have relied on Professor Henderson's conclusion, because
Thomas uses the issue of timing as a mechanism for distinguishing the compulsory nonsuit
from modern summary judgment. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 156 ("Also, summary
judgment occurs before a jury trial, while the compulsory nonsuit occurred after a jury
trial."). In support of her conclusion, Henderson cites a trio of cases (including Abbot,
which I discuss in the text at notes infra 85-99) in which a post-verdict nonsuit was entered
by the court en banc. The evidence seems clear, though, that trial court judges could enter
a compulsory nonsuit against a plaintiff before the rendition of a verdict. See, e.g., Birt v.
Barlow, 1 Doug. 172, 172 (1779) (involving en banc considering whether the trial court
judge's entry of a compulsory nonsuit against the plaintiff was correct); Sadler v. Robbins,
1 Campb. 254, 254 (1806); Ward v. Mason, 9 Price 291, 291 (1821); see also 2 William Tidd,
The Practice of the Court of King's Bench, in Personal Actions 866-68 (R. H. Small 4th
ed. 1856) ("And if it be clear that, in point of law, the action will not lie, the judge at nisi
prius will nonsuit the plaintiff, although the objection appear on the record, and might be
taken advantage of by motion is arrest of judgment, or on a writ of error." (emphasis in
original)). Professor Oldham's exhaustive research of the trial notes of Lord Mansfield
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confirmed the constitutionality of the compulsory nonsuit.9 Thus, in
determining whether the compulsory nonsuit supports the modern
use of summary judgment, it is simply necessary to resolve the
reasons why a compulsory nonsuit might have been entered against a
plaintiff under English common law and compare those to the reasons
that a modern summary judgment motion might be granted.7"
B. Case Law Under the Nonsuit
1. Ellis v. Galindo
To start, it seems clear that a judge would not enter a compulsory
nonsuit against a plaintiff because the judge found the plaintiff's
versions of the facts to be unlikely. This point is perhaps best
illustrated in the 1783 case of Ellis v. Galindo.7' The Ellis case
involved a suit by plaintiff James Ellis against defendant James
Galindo seeking money damages.72 James Galindo, brother of the
confirm that the nonsuit could be, and was, used in a manner other than the post-verdict
manner suggested by Professor Henderson. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 10-12.
Regardless of these (somewhat inevitable) questions regarding the use of the
compulsory nonsuit under English common law in 1791, the Supreme Court of the United
States confirmed the 1791 existence of the pre-verdict compulsory nonsuit under English
common law in Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U.S. 301 (1896). In Coughran, the Court
explained that its previous decision in Elmore v. Grymes, 26 U.S. 469 (1828), prohibiting
compulsory nonsuits in federal court was not based on Seventh Amendment concerns but
rather a perceived duty under Congressional statute requiring federal courts to apply any
state prohibition to this effect. See Coughran, 164 U.S. at 307-08. In Coughran, the Court
concluded that the use of a pre-verdict compulsory nonsuit did not violate the
constitutional right to a trial by jury. See id. Thus, although I disagree with Professor
Henderson's conclusion that a compulsory nonsuit under English common law could not
be entered before a jury verdict had taken place, and although I also disagree with
Professor Thomas's conclusion that the use of the compulsory nonsuit was rare, these
arguments seem nevertheless to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Coughran. By confirming the validity of a pre-verdict compulsory nonsuit, the Supreme
Court implicitly declared that this procedural device was sufficiently well established
under English common law in 1791 to be relevant to a historical analysis under the
Seventh Amendment.
68. Coughran, 164 U.S. 301. This decision is described more fully in the preceding
footnote.
69. Id.
70. In some instances, a Seventh Amendment analysis has mechanically proceeded
by asking whether a certain procedure existed under the common law rather than
inquiring in more depth as to the reasons or analysis required by that particular procedure.
As explained in the text at notes 206-33, I believe this type of superficial analysis was at
play in the Court's holding in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-61
(1935), affirming the constitutionality of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
71. Ellis v. Galindo, 1 Doug. 250 n.71. (1783).
72. See id.
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defendant, owed money to Ellis," and drafted a bill of exchange
directing the defendant Galindo to pay Ellis.4 The defendant had
accepted the bill of exchange,75 and by accepting the bill became liable
to Ellis for James's debt to Ellis. 6 When the bill became due Ellis
sought payment from James rather than from the defendant, at which
time James made partial payment to Ellis.7 In addition to this partial
payment, James made an endorsement on Ellis's bill that (1)
documented James's partial payment to Ellis and (2) promised to pay
Ellis the remaining balance on the bill within three months.8 James
obviously did not fulfill this promise, as Ellis subsequently brought
suit against the defendant on the bill of exchange accepted by the
defendant.
Under established English case law, a payee could discharge an
acceptor by express language to that effect (but not by silence or
inaction).7 ' Thus, the issue in the Ellis case was whether Ellis, by
agreeing to the endorsement by James, had absolved the defendant of
liability on the accepted bill. Lord Mansfield originally concluded
that the acceptor had been discharged, and thus nonsuited the
plaintiff." Upon further consideration by the full court, the question
of whether there had been a discharge was determined to be "a
question of intention arising out of the circumstances."" With the
case hinging upon the resolution of this fact question, the court held
that a nonsuit was inappropriate and that the case should have been




76. This is true even if, as Judge Mansfield seemed to believe in the case, see id., the
defendant had not received consideration for pledging himself to Ellis for James's debt
and did so only as an accommodation for his brother. See James Stevens Rogers, The
Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265,292 (1990) ("[A] person who has accepted a bill
as an accommodation to the drawer is bound by that acceptance.").
77. Ellis, 1 Doug. at 250 n.71.
78. Id.
79. See Dingwall v. Dunster, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 161 (K.B.); 1 Doug. 247. Also, the
law was clear that the payee's acceptance of partial payment by the drawer did not
constitute a discharge of the acceptor. See id. at 162-63.
80. Ellis, 1 Doug. at 250 n.71.
81. Id. at 250.
82. Id. at 250-51. Curiously, although the court concluded that the entry of nonsuit
against the plaintiff was erroneous, the court did not order a new trial. See id. Although
this result seems odd, English common law generally precluded a full court from granting
a new trial when (1) the amount in controversy was relatively small and (2) the ultimate
disposition was not necessarily inconsistent with the law. See, e.g., Tindal v. Brown, 1 T.R.
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The Ellis case nicely demonstrates that a compulsory nonsuit
could not be used as a mechanism for determining the existence of a
material fact.3  This propositions supports Professor Thomas's
167 (1786). Both of these elements were applicable in Ellis. The amount in controversy
was only 26 pounds. Ellis, 1 Doug. at 250 n.71. Moreover, the ultimate disposition by the
court was not necessarily legally wrong. The court had concluded that Judge Mansfield's
initial grant of a nonsuit was erroneous, but this did not necessarily mean that the
judgment for the defendant was erroneous, as the defendant might also have won if the
case had been properly submitted to a jury for a determination on the factual question of
whether Ellis had intended to discharge the Defendant Galindo. In fact, the Ellis court
noted that the endorsement promise of James to Ellis to pay in three months was probably
made with the express purpose of discharging the Defendant. See id. The analysis the
court used in Ellis to conclude that the victory for the defendant was not necessarily wrong
and thus deserving of a new trial is simply a very aggressive application of the modem rule
that an appellant must show that a trial court's error was harmful in order for the appellate
court to reverse. See generally Rory Ryan et al., Interlocutory Review of Orders Denying
Remand Motions, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 734, 762-63 (2011) (explaining the harmless error
rule).
83. There are a few outlier cases I have come across which might be read to suggest
that a nonsuit could be entered when the judges' viewed the evidence as making a
particular fact either very probable or improbable. In Oakapple v. Corpus, (1791) 100
Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B.); 4 T.R. 361, the plaintiff-landlord sought to eject the defendant-
tenant before the termination of the lease. See id. The question in the case was whether,
upon receiving the landlord's notice of termination, the tenant had consented to this early
termination and thus waived this defense to the landlord's ejectment. See id. The
evidence on this point consisted of the tenant's verbal reaction to having received the
notice of early termination, which was "I pay rent enough already; and it is hard to use me
thus." Id. The court acknowledged that whether the tenant had assented to the earlier
termination date was "a question of fact for the jury" but concluded that the evidence did
not support this view. See id. at 1064-65. The tenant's reaction, rather than consenting to
the earlier date, was "the answer of an angry man." Id. at 1065. Thus, the court reversed
the plaintiff's verdict and entered a nonsuit against the plaintiff. See id. at 1064-65.
Another case arguably along these same lines is Sproat v. Matthews, (1786) 99 Eng.
Rep 1041 (K.B.); 1 T.R. 182. The Sproat case involved a suit by the plaintiff (an endorsee
of the payee on a bill of exchange) against the drawee of the bill. See id. The question in
the case was whether the defendant-drawee had made an absolute or conditional
acceptance of the bill. Id. at 1042. After presenting the bill to the defendant (twice), the
plaintiff-endorsee had taken the bill to a notary public, where it was noted for
nonacceptance. See id. If the defendant's acceptance was conditional, the plaintiff's act of
noting it for nonacceptance could constitute a rejection of the defendant's acceptance and
a waiver of the plaintiff's right to recover against the defendant. If, however, the
defendant's acceptance had been absolute, the plaintiff's subsequent conduct could not
relieve the defendant from liability and the plaintiff was entitled to recovery against the
defendant. See id. The plaintiff had been involuntarily nonsuited, and the en banc court
in Sproat was considering the propriety of this nonsuit. See id.
The facts on which the question of the defendant's acceptance would be determined
were contested by the parties. See id. at 1043 (stating that "the defendant's counsel
admitted this evidence to be true"). These facts were supplied by the testimony of the
plaintiff's clerk wl~o had presented the bill to the defendant for acceptance. See id. ("This
case was proved by one witness on the part of the plaintiff"). That the court references
the testimony of the plaintiff's witness suggests that the nonsuit against the plaintiff was
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entered after the plaintiff had presented testimony at trial. The first time the defendant
was presented with the bill, he clearly refused to accept the bill; the drawer of the bill had
consigned a ship and cargo to the defendant, but it was not clear whether this ship would
arrive at Bristol or London and the defendant would only accept the bill if the ship arrived
in London. See id. at 1042. The second time the defendant was presented with the bill, the
defendant stated that "the bill was a good one, and that it would be paid even if the ship
were lost." Id. The question was whether the defendant, by these words, had
unconditionally accepted the bill regardless of whether the ship ultimately arrived in
Bristol or London, which was the condition that had prevented the defendant from
accepting in the first instance.
The en banc court affirmed the nonsuit by a two-to-one vote, but unraveling the
separate analysis of each of the judges requires some care. Id. at 1042-44. To Judge
Willes, the question of whether the defendant had absolutely or conditionally accepted the
bill turned on the defendant's intent and, as such, should have been sent to the jury:
"Therefore if there was a doubt whether this was a conditional or an absolute
acceptance.., the whole of the facts should have been left to the jury." Id. at 1043. Thus,
as this case required a jury determination, Judge Willes would have overturned the
nonsuit. See id.
Both Judges Buller and Ashhurt were of the opinion that the nonsuit was correct,
but their analysis arguably proceeds along different paths. Judge Buller clearly indicates
that he believes that the case turns "on a point of law" and that "it should not have been
left to the jury." Id. Judge Buller seems to base this conclusion on the premise that the
spoken words of the defendant (the existence of which were not contested) were to be
given operative legal effect by the court regardless of the defendant's actual intent in
uttering them. See id. at 1043-44. This mode of analysis is familiar enough, and is the type
of analysis that results in certain terms within legal documents acquiring status as a legal
term of art. Under this mode of analysis, of course, the legal effect of a term of art is a
question of law that must be answered by the judge. See 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 34:5 (4th ed. 2012)
("However, usage cannot control words having a definite legal meaning, and, at common
law, it was said that usage could not be used to interpret a contract unless there was an
uncertainty on the face of the instrument.").
Judge Ashhurt, however, arguably views the dispositive legal question as turning on
the actual intent of the parties. See Sproat, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1043 (distinguishing a written
acceptance, which "speaks for itself," from an oral acceptance, which turns on "the
evidentia rei"). In this respect, Judge Ashhurt's view of the law governing the dispositive
question before the court seems to mirror that of Judge Willes. Whereas Judge Willes
thought that this factual question of intent had to be submitted to the jury, Judge Ashhurt
thought that "there could be nothing to leave to a jury." Id. Judge Ashhurt reached this
conclusion, apparently, on the view that the defendant's language was best viewed as a
conditional acceptance. If true, Judge's Ashhurt had determined that the defendant's
intent was so likely to be conditional that a nonsuit was granted. This probability analysis,
of course, is the very type of probability analysis that concerns Judge Thomas.
Despite the existence of a few outlier cases, I continue to believe that Judge Thomas
is largely accurate in positing that judges did not decide cases based on their view of the
probability of the underlying facts to the litigation. The Sproat case (with the possible
exception of Judge Ashhurt's analysis) illustrates that whether a dispute involves a
question of fact or question of law can depend on how the underlying substantive law is
interpreted. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 35-43 (discussing the slipperiness of the law-
fact distinction). For Judge Willes, the substantive law required an analysis of intent (a
factual question), while Judge Buller seems to believe that the judges were responsible for
giving operative legal effect to the words spoken by the defendant. And a case like
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arguments regarding summary judgment-once her arguments are
appropriately confined. Recall that Professor Thomas has broadly
asserted that summary judgment is always unconstitutional; in reality,
her analysis presumes only a particular type of summary judgment
analysis-probability theory. The Ellis case supports Professor
Thomas's conclusion with regard to summary judgments granted
under a probability analysis because Ellis demonstrates that the
compulsory nonsuit was not used as a mechanism by which the judge
could resolve a case based on the likelihood or probability of disputed
questions of act."
However, there is historical support for the different types of
analyses on which a modern summary judgment can be based. As the
cases below demonstrate, a judge could enter a compulsory nonsuit if
the judge concluded that the evidentiary record was-as a matter of
law or policy, rather than probability-not adequate. In other words,
a judge could enter a compulsory nonsuit based on a confidence
analysis.
2. Abbot v. Plumbe
Consider first the familiar85 case of Abbot v. Plumbe.6 Abbot
involved an attempt to collect on a debt owed pursuant to a bond.87
There was testimony that the defendant/obligor had acknowledged
Oakapple does not, in my view, undermine the scores of cases (like the Ellis) which
comport with Professor Thomas's views.
84. This conclusion is made even more apparent in Ellis when one considers that the
judges in Ellis strongly believed, from the evidence adduced, that the defendant's version
of the facts was much more likely than Ellis's. See supra notes 81-82. Despite their own
views of the probable facts from this record evidence, the judges did not consider that the
nonsuit might have been justified pursuant to their own views on this factual question.
85. The Abbot case has been considered by many of the academics interested in the
English common law compulsory nonsuit. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 11; Thomas,
The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, supra note 3,
at 723-24; Henderson, supra note 63, at 301 n.21.
86. Abbot v. Plumbe, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B.); 1 Doug. 216.
87. Id. The Abbot case is somewhat complicated by the fact that the obligor (Farr)
was a bankrupt who had made an assignment to Abbot. See id. Thus, it was Abbot who
was defending against the debt claimed by Plumbe. Further complicating matters is the
fact that, although the litigation was technically initiated by Abbot, the court uses the term
"plaintiff" to refer to the creditor (Plumbe) and "defendant" to refer to the third-party
bankrupt (Farr). See id. Despite these technicalities, the court's terminology is sound on a
common-sense level, as Farr is clearly the "real" defendant while Plumbe is clearly the
"real" plaintiff. I will follow the court's lead and employ the same terminology; others
have done the same in describing Abbot. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 11; Thomas, The
Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, supra note 3, at
723-24.
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the bond, but the subscribing witness to the bond had not been
produced.88 The case initially proceeded to a jury, which resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff.89 The issue in Abbot was whether the plaintiff
should have been nonsuited; the court ultimately concluded that a
nonsuit was warranted and entered one against the plaintiff, negating
the plaintiff's jury verdict.'
What type of analysis did the court use in concluding that a
nonsuit was warranted? In answering this question, it will be helpful
to again consider Figure C:
Probability
- m Confidence
Evidence Confidence Facts Law
Figure C
All legal commentators who have considered Abbot agree that
the case revolved around a question of law,9 and I concur with that
conclusion.' But, as Figure C demonstrates, a judge might be asked
to perform a legal analysis (represented by the dashed line) and
decide a question of law as part of the process of applying assumed
facts to the law (right side of the chart) or in determining whether a
particular evidentiary record is an adequate basis from which to
permit an analysis of whether the facts actually occurred (the left side
of the chart, a confidence analysis). The Abbot case is a clear
example of an application of a confidence analysis. The critical
question in Abbot involved the evidentiary record and whether a
certain fact could be assumed (the defendant's execution of the bond)
from a particular evidentiary record. The evidentiary record did not
88. Abbot, 1 Doug. at 216.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 216-17.
91. See OLDHAM, supra note 44, at 11 (describing Abbot as having been decided on a
"question of law"); Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English
Common Law, supra note 3, at 724 (discussing Abbot as support for her conclusion that a
compulsory nonsuit could only be granted on "a matter of law").
92. Indeed, Lord Mansfield seems to acknowledge that there is little dispute
regarding the factual question of whether the defendant had executed the bond in
question. Mansfield describes the legal rule applied by the court as a "technical rule"
based on a "captious objection." Abbot, 1 Doug. at 216.
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include the testimony of the subscribing witness and did not include
testimony that the subscribing witness could not be produced." The
court concluded that this evidentiary record was inadequate to permit
a determination on the factual question as to whether the bond had
been executed. Importantly, though, the court's decision was clearly
not based on the judges' own views as to the probability that the
defendant had, in fact, executed the bond.9" Indeed, the court seemed
to acknowledge that the defendant's execution of the bond was
probable.95 The crux in Abbot was not that the court thought this fact
was unlikely or disagreed with the jury's conclusion, but that the court
resolved-as a matter of law-that the determination of this factual
question should not even be allowed based on what existed in the
evidentiary record.96
In this sense, then, the Abbot case is a real-life application of
Professor Tribe's blue bus hypothetical.' The evidentiary record in
each suggests that the plaintiff's version of the disputed facts is more
likely to recover than the defendant's version, but nevertheless the
plaintiff cannot recover because the evidentiary record is lacking.
There are, of course, differences between the two. The blue bus
hypothetical is useful because it eliminates a probability analysis as an
explanation for the defendant's judgment by specifically determining
93. See id.
94. It goes without saying that there was no dispute in Abbot regarding the
substantive law involved. If the defendant had executed the bond, he was liable on it.
95. See supra note 92. I generally agree with Professor Thomas's conclusion that
when a court believed the jury had come to an erroneous conclusion regarding the
existence of a disputed fact, the court's only remedy was to order a new trial. See Thomas,
supra note 1, at 143.
96. Professor Thomas recognizes that Abbot is not damaging to her thesis, at least
once her broad thesis is confined to the constitutionality of a judge engaging in a
probability analysis. Indeed, Professor Thomas comes close to articulating the confidence
principle in her discussion of Abbot: "Under a compulsory nonsuit, the court would enter
judgment for the defendant only if the jury's verdict was unsupported as to a particular
matter of law. For example, the plaintiff may not have presented certain specific, required
evidence .... A compulsory nonsuit could not be ordered, however, upon general
assertions regarding the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence." Thomas, supra note 1, at
155. Of course, to acknowledge this distinction is to acknowledge the overbreadth of her
thesis that summary judgment is always unconstitutional, assuming the existence of
modern summary judgments based on the same type of analysis involved in Abbot.
Perhaps this is why Professor Thomas seems eager to quickly dismiss the nonsuit as a
relevant comparison to modem summary judgment; the other common law procedures
considered by Professor Thomas are more easily distinguished from modern summary
judgment and support her broad claim that modern summary judgment is completely
unconstitutional.
97. See supra notes 54-57. A more complete discussion of the blue bus hypothetical
can be found in Meier, supra note 4.
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that the plaintiff's version of the disputed facts is 80% probable. The
Abbot case is similar to the blue bus hypothetical in that the court did
not doubt the probability of the plaintiff's version of the disputed fact
(whether the defendant had executed the bond). In fact, the judges,
similar to the blue bus hypothetical, seemed to think it extremely
likely that the defendant had, in fact, executed the bond. Of course,
the probability that the defendant had executed the bond in Abbot
could not be reduced to a precise percentage. This is true of most
real world-as opposed to hypothetical-disputes. In this sense, then,
the Abbot case is not as explicit as the blue bus hypothetical in
eliminating probability as an explanation for the decision against the
plaintiff. On the other hand, it is easier to identify the nature of the
dispositive legal analysis in Abbot as opposed to the blue bus
hypothetical. The legal nature of the analysis in Abbot was made
more explicit by the application of a specific legal rule: A subscribing
witness had to testify to the execution of the bond or there needed to
be evidence that the subscribing witness could not be produced. In
the blue bus hypothetical, the policy considerations that inform the
confidence analysis cannot be reduced to a specific rule easily applied
to a discrete factual setting. Of course, in a jurisdiction in which the
blue bus hypothetical has been resolved according to summary
judgment, in subsequent litigation involving a similar incident and a
similar evidentiary record, the legal nature of the blue bus "rule"
would be more apparent (as in Abbot) because that preexisting rule
would be applied to a particular setting. Thus, it is perhaps easier to
retroactively recognize the legal nature of a confidence analysis once
that analysis has been reduced to a rule. In a case of first impression,
though, it might be more challenging to recognize that the summary
judgment is based on a conclusion regarding the state of the record
rather than the conclusions that might be drawn from the record.
One additional point is worth mentioning regarding the Abbot
case. The nature of the decision in Abbot is perhaps best appreciated
by considering the fact that a nonsuit "left the plaintiff free to try
again.,98 When a nonsuit was entered in a case like Abbot, nothing
had been decided about the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim.
This means that the court in Abbot had not determined that the
defendant had, in reality, failed to execute the bond. If this factual
conclusion had been the basis of the nonsuit in Abbot, it would be
odd to give the plaintiff another crack at getting this factual question
decided in his favor. But this is not what occurred in Abbot. Rather,
98. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391 n.23.
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the court's decision was simply a decision about the evidence the
plaintiff had assembled on that question at the time of the trial. Of
course, a legal system could choose to prohibit a plaintiff from trying
again when that plaintiff has failed to assemble an evidentiary record
that can satisfy a confidence analysis, but the common law took a
more forgiving approach to plaintiffs who had failed to assemble the
necessary evidence at trial.9  As such, Abbot was free to get the
subscribing witness to the bond and to file suit again.
3. Birt v. Barlow
The decision in Birt v. Barlow" °  provides another fine example of
a compulsory nonsuit based on a confidence analysis. The case
involved a civil suit by Birt against Barlow for Barlow's "criminal
conversion" of Birt's wife.'°' Recovery for a criminal conversion
existed if the defendant had slept with the plaintiff's wife.'O
Obviously, it was necessary to show that Birt was married to the
99. Current federal law is not as forgiving to the plaintiff who loses a case on
summary judgment based on a confidence analysis. The entry of summary judgment
against a plaintiff-including a summary judgment based on a confidence analysis-
precludes that plaintiff from bringing the suit again. See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4444 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that
summary judgment is considered as a decision on the merits and results in preclusion,
subject to a few minor exceptions). The reason that a modern summary judgment motion
decided pursuant to a confidence analysis results in preclusion, while a common law
nonsuit entered pursuant o a confidence analysis did not result in preclusion, can be
understood in terms of the opportunity provided a modern plaintiff to assemble an
evidentiary record through discovery. The common law plaintiff had no such luxury, and
thus the forgiving approach afforded to the common law plaintiff who had failed to
assemble an adequate record makes complete sense.
This same issue arises in the context of a modern motion to dismiss that is granted
according to a confidence analysis. Should a plaintiff who has failed to allege adequate
facts and thus fails a confidence analysis at this early stage be precluded from filing a new
lawsuit or, at least, amending the complaint to allege the necessary facts? See Meier, supra
note 4.
100. Birt v. Barlow, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 113 (K.B.); 1 Doug. 171. The Birt case is
distinct from Abbot in that Abbot involved the initial denial of a nonsuit while Birt
involves the initial entry of a nonsuit. See id. In both cases, the initial decision was held
incorrect by the entire court, sitting en banc. In addition, in both instances, the decision to
enter a nonsuit (the full court en banc in Abbot and Justice Blackstone in Birt) was based
on a confidence analysis, as explained above in the text.
101. Id.
102. See Margaret Valentine Turano, Jane Austen, Charlotte Bronte, and the Marital
Property Law, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 179, 185 (1998) ("If a wife slept with another man,
her husband could collect damages from him in an action ironically known as "'criminal
conversation."').
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woman who had slept with Barlow.'°3 One way in which a marriage
might occur is as the result of a formal wedding ceremony." This is
how Birt sought to prove a marriage between Birt and the woman
who slept with Barlow. In this regard, Birt introduced a copy of a
church registry listing a 1767 marriage between "John Birt" and
"Harriot Champneys."'' Justice Blackstone nonsuited the plaintiff,
however, concluding that the entry of the registry alone was not
adequate and that testimony from a witness to the ceremony was
needed, at least in cases (such as the Birt case) where there were
witnesses to the ceremony and no explanation had been offered as to
why this testimony could not be produced.'0°
As in Abbot, the entry of a compulsory nonsuit by Justice
Blackstone in Birt is clearly based on a confidence analysis. The
problem for Birt, according to Blackstone, was the state of the record
from which Birt sought to prove the existence of a marriage. This is
clear from Justice Blackstone's reasoning: "this was not sufficient
evidence of the marriage";'0 7 "I still thought that the evidence...
would be insufficient";"°8 "the best proof that could be given of an
actual marriage was by the solemnity of a person";'°9 "I could not
admit less proof than that of some person present. ''H As in Abbot,
the Birt Court was not concerned with the probability that the
marriage ceremony had, in fact, occurred. Indeed, if an opinion was
based on a probability analysis, it would have read dramatically
different, and would have included a discussion of the judge's own
views from the evidence as to whether the wedding ceremony had, in
fact, occurred. However, the opinions in Birt do not contain this
probability analysis. For instance, Lord Mansfield's opinion includes
a technical analysis of the effect of the Marriage Act on the case at
bar."' Obviously, Lord Mansfield's legal analysis would be
completely misplaced if the question was whether the wedding
ceremony had, in fact, occurred. The consideration of the effect of a
103. Birt, 1 Doug. at 171-72. It would be necessary as well "to prove the fact of
adultery." Id. at 172.
104. There were other ways in which a man and woman might achieve the legal status
of "married," as noted by Lord Mansfield in Birt. See id. at 174.
105. Id. at 171.





111. Id. at 174.
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statute, however, makes complete sense if the question before the
court is limited to the confidence question of whether additional
specific evidence is needed before the case can proceed to a jury.
The discussion in Birt is informative of the types of policy or
legal questions that might be relevant in a confidence analysis.'
First, in determining whether more evidence will be required, the
availability of additional evidence must be considered.'13 This aspect
of the confidence inquiry is clearly present in Justice Blackstone's
analysis when he considers the other types of "collateral proof" which
might be adequate in instances in which the witnesses to the
ceremony are dead or in which the ceremony took place without any
witnesses at all."4 Second, the consequences of allowing a case to
proceed to a factual determination from a skimpy evidentiary record
must be considered.15 This policy consideration is evident in Birt as
well; Lord Mansfield notes the "penal" character of a criminal
conversation cause of action,1" meaning that the risk of an erroneous
jury verdict is perhaps higher in this quasi-criminal setting than it is in
a standard civil suit.
1 17
In Birt, the court ultimately held that the conclusion Justice
Blackstone had reached on the confidence question was erroneous
and that the entry of nonsuit was erroneous."8 Upon reaching this
conclusion, the legal issues in the case had been resolved. Notably,
the court conceded that the factual question of whether the ceremony
had, in fact, occurred was out of its hands: The occurrence of the
ceremony could be "proved in a thousand different ways" in
"whatever is sufficient to satisfy the jury."119
112. This issue is explored in more depth in Meier, supra note 4.
113. See id. at 39. ("The other question to be resolved as part of the confidence
analysis requires a determination of how much of the available evidence has been
presented and the likelihood that more information might change the best-guess point
estimate of probability.").
114. Birt, 1 Doug. at 172.
115. Meier, supra note 4, at 38 ("The acceptable margin of error question requires a
determination as to the legal system's tolerance of the possibility that further evidence
might change the probability assessment of a material fact.").
116. Birt, 1 Doug. at 174.
117. See Meier, supra note 4 (explaining that the consequences of an erroneous
criminal conviction are more grave than an erroneous verdict for a plaintiff in a civil suit,
and that a confidence analysis will therefore usually require a more complete evidentiary
record in a criminal case, and also suggesting that the jury might consider the confidence
question in reaching a verdict).
118. See Birt, 1 Doug. at 175 (ordering a new trial).
119. Id. at 174-75.
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4. Berryman v. Wise
The case of Berryman v. Wise'2 (decided in the benchmark year
of 1791121) constitutes another example of a case in which a
compulsory nonsuit is entertained on the basis of a confidence
argument. The Berryman case involved a slander suit against a
defendant who accused the plaintiff of "swindling.' ' 22 As part of his
claim, the plaintiff sought to prove that he was an attorney23 and had
introduced evidence of his profession.' The defendant, however,
sought a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence needed to
include evidence of either the plaintiff's admission as an attorney to a
particular court or "a copy of the roll of attornies [sic].'
125
The defendant's argument in favor of a nonsuit in Berryman is
clearly based on a confidence analysis. The argument addresses the
relationship between the ultimate fact that needed to be determined
by the jury (whether the plaintiff was an attorney) and the evidence
the plaintiff had assembled on that question. Importantly, though,
the relationship between evidence and ultimate fact was not
considered from the perspective of probability. The defendant was
not asking the court to make a judgment as to the probability that the
plaintiff was, in fact, an attorney; there is nothing in the Berryman
opinion that even remotely could be viewed as addressing whether
the judges actually believed the plaintiff was an attorney. Rather, the
court's analysis strictly considers the adequacy of the evidence
assembled on that question.
The court in Berryman ultimately rejected the confidence
argument that was asserted by the defendant. The court concluded
that the plaintiff had assembled "sufficient proof.'' 26 The court noted
that in other cases in which a party's status as an attorney was
material, "the proof now insisted on has never been required."'27
The ultimate conclusion rejecting the defendant's confidence
argument is irrelevant; what is important is that the argument was
120. Berryman v. Wise, (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1067 (K.B.).
121. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 376; Dimick, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
122. See Berryman, 100 Eng. Rep at 1067.
123. Id. Proof of his profession as an attorney would entitle the plaintiff to different
rules regarding damages. See William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 841
(1960).
124. See Berryman, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1067.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1068.
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made in the context of a compulsory nonsuit. The court's analysis in
Berryman engages in the confidence analysis asserted by the
defendant. Reading Berryman, one does not get the sense that the
court considered the nature of the defendant's argument as unusual
or that it was inappropriate for a nonsuit. Rather, the court simply
engages the confidence argument on its merits.
128
128. Another English common law case involving a compulsory nonsuit and a
confidence analysis is Syeds v. Hay, (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1008 (K.B.); 4 T.R. 260, 260-61.
The Syeds case involves a conversion suit by the owner of goods against the captain of the
vessel in which the goods had been shipped. See id. The plaintiff had instructed the
defendant, upon reaching the destination, not to unload the goods on the wharf. Id.
Despite promising not to do so, the defendant did unload the goods upon reaching the
wharf, where they were then in the possession of a third party who refused to deliver them
to the owner without the payment of a fee. Id. As a defense to the plaintiff's conversion
claim, the defendant attempted to prove a trade usage under which he was essentially
required to unload the goods on the dock into the possession of the third-party
"wharfinger." Id. The case proceeded to trial and a jury verdict for the plaintiff. See id.
Before the en banc court, however, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a nonsuit
based on the existence of this trade usage. See id.
The court rejected the defendant's argument in favor of a nonsuit. See id. at 1009-
10. Notably, however, the court did not reach this conclusion based on a rejection of the
merits of the legal argument put forward by the defendant. Thus, the court seemed to
accept that if a trade usage required the defendant to unload into the possession of the
third-party wharfinger, the plaintiff could not maintain a conversion action against the
defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the defendant had not put forward
"satisfactory evidence" of the trade usage. Id. at 1009.
The defendant's evidence of the factual existence of the trade usage consisted of the
trial testimony "from several witnesses." Id. at 1008. The attorneys for the plaintiffs had
argued to the court that this evidence was not adequate: "[T]he evidence of usage offered
did not support the right of the wharfinger. The mere opinion of the witnesses is of no
weight. Usage must be established, either by reputation or by the actual exaction of the
demand." Id. The defendant's attorney made the unfortunate mistake of misconstruing
the nature of the plaintiff's attorney's argument; the defendant's attorney responded as if
the question before the court was the factual existence of the trade usage rather than the
type of evidence that the defendant had assembled on that particular question: "[A]ll the
evidence given [on the trade usage] was in support of such a right; and, however slight, it
must be taken to be true, as none was opposed to it." Id. at 1009.
The defendant's argument can be compared to an argument that the plaintiff in
Professor Tribe's blue bus hypothetical might make: "Judge, there is admittedly not much
evidence on the question of who owned the bus that ran over my client, but the evidence
we do have-which is undisputed-suggests that it was the defendant, and for this reason
the plaintiff must be victorious in this case." In both situations, the argument advanced
has failed to appreciate the difference between probability and confidence and thus
assumed that the point in contention is probability when, in reality, the dispositive
question is related to confidence. Of course, this probability argument is misplaced in the
blue bus hypothetical, and the court in Syeds correctly recognized that the defendant's
argument was also misplaced; Chief Justice Kenyon reasoned that the defendant's
evidence of trade usage was not "satisfactory" and Judge Buller similarly concluded that
the trial testimony on this point was "no evidence." Id. at 1009-10. Having failed to
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III. The Constitutionality of a Confidence Theory of Summary
Judgment: Analogy to Other Procedures
To buttress the conclusion that a confidence theory of summary
judgment is constitutional under the Seventh Amendment, it is also
worthwhile to consider the analytical similarities between a
confidence analysis and other legal rules that shape the litigation
process. Upon close inspection, a judge's summary judgment analysis
under a confidence analysis is a sibling of the law governing
presumptions and a close cousin of the law governing evidence.
When a judge applies an evidentiary presumption or excludes
evidence under the law of evidence, the judge is making a legal
provide adequate evidence on the question of trade usage, the defendant's nonsuit was
rejected and the plaintiff's jury verdict was preserved. See id. at 1010.
An interesting question in Syeds is why the defendant suffered the consequences of
the incomplete evidentiary record. Usually, the plaintiff has the burden of producing an
evidentiary record that is adequate to satisfy a confidence analysis. Thus, in the cases
discussed in this section, or in the blue bus hypothetical, the incomplete record is the
plaintiff's problem. In other situations, however, such as with an affirmative defense, the
burden of producing an adequate evidentiary record (including the burden of satisfying a
confidence analysis) can be shifted to the defendant. See Robert Belton, Causation and
Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts
on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1385 (1990) (stating that an
affirmative defense usually means that the burden of producing evidence on this point falls
on the defendant). The result in Syeds, in which the skimpy evidentiary record was held
against the defendant, can be viewed in terms of the modern approach for issues
recognized as an affirmative defense. The court viewed the plaintiff as having the burden
of producing evidence related to the conversion claim, while the defendant had the burden
of producing evidence on the trade usage theory. Like a modern affirmative defense, the
trade usage theory did not undermine the plaintiff's prima facie claim of a conversion but
rather offered an additional consideration which precluded recovery on that theory. See
Syeds, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("The defendant, by way of justification ... attempted to set
up a usage .... "); id. at 1009 (including the arguments of the defendant's attorneys, which
"admitted" the "prima facie evidence of a conversion" but "justif[ied] his denial under the
[trade usage]"); id. at 1010 (Buller, J.) ("[I]f the wharfage-duty be due, that will be an
answer to the present action."); see also 5 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1270
(comparing an affirmative defense to the common law plea (which was not involved in
Syeds) of a confession and avoidance, in that both involve an instance where the
defendant wants to rely on additional material or information to preclude the plaintiff
from recovery on a prima facie claim).
In my article Probability, Confidence, and Twombly's Plausibility Standard, I
explain that the modern "plausibility" standard from the Supreme Court's decision in
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, is simply an application of the confidence analysis at the pleadings
stage of litigation. See Meier, supra note 14. Once this is appreciated, the Syeds opinion
sheds some light on the modern-day question of whether the plausibility standard should
be applied to other pleadings such as a defendant's affirmative defense. See Joseph A.
Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 991-92 (2012)
(arguing that the plausibility analysis should be applied to affirmative defenses raised by
the defendant).
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decision that might inform or shape the jury's decision with regard to
probability. None of these legal decisions, however, implicate the
Seventh Amendment.
A. The Law of Presumptions
As Professors Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth Graham have
aptly stated, "'presumption' is a word of many meanings.
' 29
Fortunately, the ambiguities associated with this term, and the
complexity of the doctrine surrounding presumptions, need not be
resolved (or even addressed) here. Rather, the objective is to
demonstrate that, at a basic level, a judge entering summary judgment
pursuant to a confidence analysis has employed a legal analysis that
closely resembles the analytical process involved with a presumption.
To appreciate this point, it is only necessary to consider presumptions
at a very basic level.
The law of presumptions concerns the relationship between two
facts; these two facts are usually deemed the "basic fact" and the
"presumed fact.""13 The presumed fact is a fact that is relevant to a
litigation dispute; the basic fact is used to show that the presumed fact
exists. In this sense, then, the law governing presumptions exists
within the broader context of circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence is evidence of one fact that is intended to prove the
existence of a different fact."' The law of presumptions provides
specific legal rules that, when applicable, provide guidance as to the
use of circumstantial evidence.3
While many of the legal rules regarding presumptions are
complex and, in some ways, convoluted,133 all jurisdictions are in
129. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, §5122.1.
130. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confilsion and It Has
Come to This, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 383, 389-90 (1992) (using terms).
131. See Meier, supra note 4.
132. See ADOLFO GIULIANI, Civilian Treatises on Presumptions 1580-1620, THE LAW
OF PRESUMPTIONS: ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY 23 (R. H. Helmholz &
W. David H. Sellar eds., 2009) ("[With presumptions] a conclusion may be reached
independently or even in absence of direct proof (testimony and documents). This is
indeed the typical working scenario of presumptions: a decision to be taken in absence of
information. Hence they are relevant in all those situations which deny access to direct
evidence."). This is not to say that a presumption can exist only when a party lacks direct
evidence. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5125.1, at 539 (discussing Ohio rules
which precludes consideration of a presumption when a party has direct evidence of a
presumed fact, but calling this a "peculiar [] rule" and citing case law to the contrary).
133. See Edmund M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 255 (1937)
("Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter
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agreement on at least one principle: When a party provides evidence
to prove the existence of a basic fact and there is a presumption
linking the basic fact to the presumed fact, the party has met its
burden of production with the presumed fact."' In other words, a
party is benefited by a presumption when she introduces evidence of
the basic fact, because this entitles her to a jury determination
regarding the existence of the presumed fact. For example, if a
plaintiff needs to prove Fact B to recover from the defendant, and if
the plaintiff introduces evidence of Fact A, and if there is an
applicable presumption regarding Fact A and Fact B,135 then the
plaintiff is-at the very least 36 -entitled to a jury determination as to
the existence of Fact B.
Notice the similarity between what occurs under a presumption
and what occurs when a judge grants summary judgment under a
confidence analysis. To start with, consider that when a party has
direct evidence of a material fact, that party has met her burden of
production with regard to that fact.137 Thus, as with presumptions, the
confidence theory of summary judgment applies only when a party
seeks to prove a material fact by circumstantial evidence. Under a
confidence analysis, a judge determines that a party's circumstantial
evidence is not adequate. As explained previously, this conclusion is
not a determination as to the probability of the material fact, but
rather is a legal or policy decision. With a presumption, the analysis
is the same but the law's conclusion is simply different: When a
presumption applies, the circumstantial evidence is adequate to allow
has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with
a feeling of despair.").
134. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5126, at 544-45 (describing that this
result occurs under each of the main, competing theories regarding presumptions).
135. This assumes, of course, that the presumption concerns the extrapolation of Fact
B from Fact A (a presumption from A to B) and not the extrapolation of Fact A from Fact
B (B triggers A).
136. There might be additional benefits stemming from the existence of the
presumption. For instance, the existence of the presumption might shift the burden of
production to the opposing party, such that the party resisting the presumed fact must
introduce evidence contradicting the presumed fact or lose the ability to challenge the
relationship between the basic fact and the presumed fact. See Id. at 546-49 (describing
how a presumption shifts the burden of production to an opponent under the Morgan-
McCormick and Thayer-Wigmore theories of presumptions but not under Federal Rule of
Evidence 301). Additionally, a presumption might shift the burden of persuasion to the
opponent of the presumption. See id; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5122.1, at
430-31 (describing how, under the Morgan-McCormick theory, a presumption shifts the
burden of persuasion to the opponent).
137. See Meier, supra note 4.
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the issue to proceed to a jury for a probability determination. Here
again, though, no decision has been made as to whether the presumed
fact actually occurred: The case must proceed to a fact-finder for a
resolution of the probability question.
138
In reality, then, a confidence analysis and a presumption are just
opposite sides of the same coin. Another way to conceive of a
presumption is that the law has resolved the confidence question for a
very particular situation involving circumstantial evidence in favor of
the proponent of that evidence. Thus, the issue is resolved in favor of
proceeding to a fact finder for determination rather than premature
termination.
To demonstrate, consider a case in which the plaintiff wishes to
prove that the defendants entered into a conspiracy in violation of
antitrust law. The plaintiff has no direct evidence as to the defendants
entering into this conspiracy. However, the plaintiff can show that
these defendants have coordinated their behavior before, and that the
defendants all acted in a similar way in this instance.'39 If a court
concludes-based on legal and policy concerns-that his evidence is
not adequate so as to allow the case to proceed to a jury
determination of probability on the question of conspiracy, this will
be done through the entry of judgment for the defendant. On the
other hand, the law might reach the opposite conclusion on this
question, and a presumption is one way in which this legal conclusion
might be framed or characterized. Thus, if the law resolved that the
plaintiff's evidence of parallel conduct was sufficient to satisfy the
plaintiff's burden of production, it might be said that there is a
"presumption of conspiracy" from parallel conduct. This
presumption, at the very least, would allow the plaintiff to proceed
138. Although all presumptions satisfy the proponent's burden of production, some
presumptions might have additional implications, such as imposing a production burden
on the opponent of the presumption or imposing a burden of persuasion on the opponent
of the presumption. See supra note 136. When a presumption has this effect, it admittedly
differs from a summary judgment confidence analysis and, in some cases, might actually be
a determination as to the probability of the material fact in question. As stated in the text,
however, the aspect of presumptions which is important to the analogy being advocated
herein is only the aspect of all presumptions that they satisfy the proponent's burden of
production.
139. This "hypothetical" is, obviously, based on the fact patterns in Matsushita Electric
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, both of
which are relevant to the issue of a confidence analysis. See Meier, supra note 4
(demonstrating that the Matsushita case was decided under a confidence analysis); Meier,
supra note 14 (demonstrating that the Twombly case was decided under a confidence
analysis).
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past summary judgment and to a jury trial on the factual question of
whether a conspiracy existed.
Others have recognized this relationship between the law of
presumptions and a judge's confidence analysis. Professors Ronald
Allen and Craig Callen use the term "isomorphic" to express the
analytical similarity between the tWO:14 "The critical point for
analyzing and teaching presumptions is that, with respect to the
allocations of burdens of production and persuasion, presumptions
allocating the burden of production replicate the effects of the more
general standard for judgments [entered by the judge] as a matter of
law. ' , 14' The operative difference is that a presumption works in favor
of the proponent of the evidence while a confidence inquiry is most
apparent when it is resolved against he proponent of the evidence.42
Of course, to the extent that a presumption satisfies the burden
of production, and a confidence inquiry can result in a conclusion that
a party has failed the burden of production, a relevant distinction
might be drawn in terms of the effect on the constitutional right to a
jury under the Seventh Amendment. After all, a presumption-by
140. See Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, Teaching "Bloody Instructions": Civil
Presumptions and the Lessons of Isomorphism, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 933, 934 (2003)
("Additionally, [presumptions] are isomorphic with other evidentiary devices.").
141. Id. at 940.
142. As illustrated in the previous section, however, the result of a confidence analysis
need not be against the proponent of the evidence, and this result need not be based on
the existence of a presumption. In both the Birt and Berryman cases, the defendant
argued for a compulsory nonsuit based on a confidence theory, but in each case the court
ultimately rejected the defendant's argument. See supra notes 100-128. The conclusion
that the plaintiff had presented adequate evidence to satisfy a confidence inquiry was not
justified by reference to a presumption in either Birt or Berryman. See id. Consider,
however, how the conclusion in each case could have been justified or characterized as
resulting from a presumption. For instance, the court in Birt could have said that evidence
of the marriage registry established a presumption of marriage. Either way, the court
would be saying the same thing, which is that the evidence is legally adequate to allow the
plaintiff to argue the probability question to the jury.
The fact that a presumption satisfies a party's burden of production explains why
presumptions are not thought to be particularly helpful to a party on whom there is no
burden of production. In one vivacious articulation of the concept, Judge Lummus said
that a party seeking to take advantage of a presumption when that party does not have a
burden of production is "like a handkerchief thrown over something covered by a
blanket." Brown v. Henderson, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934) (Lummus, J., concurring). For this
reason, then, presumptions are usually applied in favor of a plaintiff, as a plaintiff usually
has the burden of production in standard civil litigation. See Jason R. Bent, The Telltale
Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the System Disparate
Treatment Theory, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 816 (2011) (stating that a plaintiff
usually has the burden of production but that a presumption on behalf of the plaintiff
might satisfy, and in some cases shift, the burden of production).
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satisfying a party's burden of production-compels jury
consideration; a confidence inquiry-when it is used as the basis for a
pre-verdict judgment-precludes jury consideration. In this sense,
the very mild form of presumption considered here (allowing the
proponent to satisfy a burden of production) could never really
violate the Seventh Amendment because the result of the
presumption is to ensure jury consideration.3
Nevertheless, the importance of the analogy made here is more
basic: Courts must make1" legal and policy decisions about whether to
send a case to a jury for a determination as to probability. In this
sense, and although the analogy is not perfect, the jury can be
compared to a computer designed to process raw data and, from this
raw data, to calculate the probability of certain events. When a court
employs a confidence analysis as the basis for a summary judgment,
the court has decided to unplug the computer so as to preclude the
calculations from being computed. This decision is based on the
undesirability of allowing these computations to be calculated; it is
not premised on the view that the calculations performed by the
computer are inaccurate or that the judge can more accurately
perform the calculation. When a court employs a presumption,
however, the law has engaged in the exact same inquiry, but has
reached a different conclusion as to the desirability of allowing the
calculations to be performed. The nature of this legal inquiry does
not violate the Seventh Amendment,'15 regardless of the ultimate
conclusion reached under this analysis.
143. Cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5129 at 590 n.30 (explaining that a
presumption that gives the jury more, rather than less, power is less likely to violate the
Seventh Amendment).
144. And, as the discussion in the previous section of this article demonstrates, judges
have always had to make these types of decisions. See also infra note 146 (discussing the
historical use of presumptions under English and American law).
145. The analogy made in the text between a confidence analysis and a presumption
relies on the mildest form of presumption. As explained in supra note 136, most
presumptions have some additional legal effect besides simply allowing the proponent to
satisfy its burden of production with regard to the presumed fact. The constitutionality of
these stronger types of evidentiary presumptions is not without doubt, particularly to the
extent that a presumption might impair the ability of the opponent of the presumption to
contest the probability of the presumed fact. See generally WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 7, § 5129. Thus far, the Supreme Court has mostly considered this question under the
rubric of the Due Process Clause rather than the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 589-603.
Of course, the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states and thus
does not apply to state trial court proceedings. See Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1916). Thus, the cases in which the Court has considered the constitutionality of
presumptions have mostly been state cases, meaning that review under the Seventh
Amendment was not available. See, e.g., W. & Atl. R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. The Law of Evidence
The point made above with regard to presumptions is perhaps
better made by considering the law of evidence. Although the law of
evidence is not as close of an analytical analogy to a confidence
analysis as is the law of presumptions, evidence law provides a vivid
example of how a judge can make legal decisions regarding the proof
process while nevertheless preserving for the jury the ultimate
determination regarding the actual existence of the disputed facts to
the litigation.
In the course of federal civil litigation, the judge is expected to
constrain the introduction of evidence to the rules contained in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. To the extent there is a dispute on the
admissibility of evidence, it is because one attorney thinks that her
prospects of success before a jury are improved if the jury hears the
evidence. A decision to exclude this evidence, then, restricts the
information available to the jury from which to make a decision
regarding the disputed facts of case. In the mind of the attorney who
wished to present this excluded evidence, the jury's decision-making
process might be impaired by this lack of information.
Even though an evidentiary rule might exclude information that
one attorney thinks is important to the jury's decision-making
process, this process by which the law restricts the information given
(1929); Mobile, Jackson & K.C. R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). To
complicate matters, the Court has intimated that the constitutionality of a presumption
might be affected by the source of the presumption. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 811
(Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 1972) (suggesting that presumptions created by legislation
might be scrutinized more closely than presumptions created by courts). The source of
presumptions is a thoroughly complicated topic, of which this article has stayed clear. See
FED. R. EVID. 301 (demarcating the effect of federal presumptions, but only those "not
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules); FED. R. EvID. 302 (directing
federal courts to apply the state law regarding presumptions "respecting a fact which is an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision").
In any event, to the extent that a presumption (stronger than the mild version
considered in this article) might be considered to raise a constitutional question under the
Seventh Amendment, the resolution to this question would seem to require an analysis of
English common law as it existed in 1791. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (stating that the
parameters of the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment are determined by
English common law practice as it existed in 1791 at the time of the Seventh Amendment's
adoption). On this front, it seems presumptions were frequently used under English
common law. See Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants' New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 319, 343-48, 350-55 (2012) (discussing, with ample citation to authority, the use of
presumptions by English common law and American courts at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, including the frequent use of the strongest type of presumption-a
conclusive presumption-and noting that the conclusive presumption was viewed as a
product of evidence law rather than the modern view of conclusive presumptions as
products of the substantive law).
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to the jury is not thought to impair the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.146  The Supreme Court has even acknowledged that
deviations from the rules of evidence, as they existed under English
common law in 1791, are not constitutionally problematic.4 7 The
reason that properly restricting information under the rules of
evidence is not problematic under the Seventh Amendment is
because they clearly involve questions of law and policy rather than
the question of what occurred in a particular case (a probability
analysis). To be sure, a jury's decision might sometimes be
determined based on the information that it is given, but deciding
what information to give the jury is different than the ultimate jury
question of what to make of that information. This distinction is what
the Supreme Court had in mind in describing the contours of the
Seventh Amendment as follows: "The limitation imposed by the
amendment is merely that.., the ultimate determination of issues of
fact by the jury be not interfered with."'4 8
In the preceding part of this article, I used the analogy of a jury
to a computer to emphasize the legal nature of both a confidence
inquiry under summary judgment and a probability inquiry. Under
the analogy, the jury is like a computer that processes information
and, from that information, calculates the probability of certain
events. Under a confidence analysis at summary judgment or an
evidentiary presumption, the question is whether to allow the
computer-the jury-to perform this calculation-a probability
analysis-at all. Under a confidence analysis, a judge might decide-
for legal and policy reasons-that he jury should not be allowed to
calculate probability from a particular evidentiary record. Thus, in
this instance, the judge pulls the plug on the computer. This analogy
also works in considering the law of evidence. Here, though, the
question is not whether the computer will be allowed to crunch the
numbers, but the slightly different question as to what to enter into
the computer. In either instance, though, the operative question
involves legal and policy decisions rather than factual determinations
146. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920) ("The command of the Seventh
Amendment that 'the right of trial by jury shall be preserved' does not ... prohibit the
introduction of new rules of evidence."); but see Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077 (2013)
(arguing that Rule 403 violates the Seventh Amendment).
147. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 309 ("It does not prohibit the introduction of
new methods for determining what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the
introduction of new rules of evidence. Changes in these may be made.").
148. Id. at 310.
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as to whether certain events did, or did not, occur in the real world.
To the extent this type of determination is necessary, it is a decision
that the jury must ultimately make. A judge can decide what
information to enter into the computer, and even whether the
computer should be turned on or off, but he cannot substitute his
calculations for those of the computer.'9
149. To be clear, I am not making the simplistic argument-anticipated and rebutted
by Professor Thomas-that summary judgment is constitutional because it always involves
a question of law. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 161-63; see also supra note 60. This
argument suffers from the fundamental deficiency that I am attempting to redress in this
article, namely, that not all summary judgments are the same. When a judge grants
summary judgment based on a view of what facts can be reasonably inferred from a
particular evidentiary record (the type of summary judgment with which Professor
Thomas is concerned), the judge is engaging in a factual inquiry. Giving this power to the
judge, and applying a legalistic term such as "reasonable" to the judge's inquiry, does not
change the reality that a judge-in performing this analysis-is making an assessment as to
what facts occurred in the real world. To pretend otherwise-by labeling this inquiry as a
"question of law"-is to deprive the terms "question of fact" and "question of law" of
almost all analytical meaning; pursuant to this view, questions of law are simply those
decided by a judge and questions of fact are those decided by a jury. Under this definition
of the terms "question of fact" and "question of law," the terms merely have a descriptive
function in describing the respective allocation of decision-making authority at the trial
court level. This descriptive definition, however, ignores the normative sense in which
these terms are sometimes used: a question of fact is something that should be decided by
a jury, while a question of law is something that should be decided by a judge.
Unfortunately, Professor Thomas, in some respects, falls into the same analytical
trap of those whose arguments she anticipates and refutes. Professor Thomas states that
"[s]cholars emphasize and overstate the importance of this law-fact distinction. The focus,
instead, should be on the common law." See Thomas, supra note 1, at 161. Thus,
according to Thomas, the Seventh Amendment reserves to the jury those questions that
would have been decided by the jury under English common law in 1791. In this sense,
then, Thomas has employed a variation of the descriptive definition of "fact" and "law"
discussed above: a question of fact is something that a jury would have resolved under
English common law in 1791, while a question of law is a question that a judge would have
decided in 1791. Here again, the analysis of what is law and what is fact is descriptive-
what decisions are given to the judge and what decisions are given to the jury?-albeit
with an historical twist.
Of course, Professor Thomas's historical approach for delineating the scope of jury
power under the Seventh Amendment is supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. See
Thompson, 170 U.S. at 350 (applying this historical approach to determine the parameters
of the Seventh Amendment). This historical approach makes the most sense, however,
when the Court is considering whether a particular issue must be decided by the jury.
Thus, for instance, in Markman, the Court used the historical approach to specifically
consider the question of whether the interpretation of a patent claim must be decided by a
jury. Markman, 517 U.S. 370.
Professor Thomas's arguments, though, do not consider how the Seventh
Amendment applies to a particular question. Instead, her arguments are much broader:
she is considering the constitutionality of the procedural device known as summary
judgment. More accurately, as this article has attempted to demonstrate, Professor
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Thomas is concerned with a particular analysis (a judge's use of a probability analysis) that
is sometimes used to enter summary judgment.
As Professor Thomas's argument involves the broader question of the
constitutionality of a particular type of procedure, I believe her arguments might have
more persuasive force if they are divorced from the rather mechanical, historical approach
she uses. In other words, the unconstitutionality of the type of summary judgment with
which Professor Thomas is concerned might be better understood from the "bird's eye"
perspective rather than the down-in-the-trenches perspective she provides. This argument
would proceed as follows: "The Seventh Amendment stands for the basic proposition that
the 'ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered with.' Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310. Broadly speaking, this means that the jury was the ultimate
arbiter in deciding what had actually transpired between the parties in the real world.
When a modern judge enters summary judgment on the premise that a 'reasonable jury'
could only come to one conclusion as to what had transpired between the parties, the
judge is making a decision that the common law assumed would be decided by the jury.
When this occurs, the Seventh Amendment is violated."
This bird's eye view of the issue resolves what I perceive as part of the resistance to
Professor Thomas's argument, which is that there is a disconnect between the history-
intense nature of her argument and broad, wide-reaching conclusions that she is drawing.
In other words, although the historical approach to the Seventh Amendment makes sense
in a case like Markman, which involved the demarcation between judge and jury with
respect to a discreet litigation issue, this sort of technical, history-based approach is
misplaced when the issue is the more fundamental question of the constitutionality of a
procedure that might be employed in a variety of scenarios. This, of course, is not to say
that there is no value in Professor Thomas's historical research. But the primary value
from this historical research, as I see it, is that it confirms the more fundamental (and, I
believe, intuitive) notion that the Seventh Amendment requires that juries, as opposed to
judges, decide what actually happened between the parties. Under this bird's eye
perspective on the issue, then, the unconstitutionality of the type of summary judgment
analysis that Professor Thomas is concerned with depends on an appreciation for the
different types of decisions that must be resolved in the litigation context rather than an
understanding of the procedural devices that were used by English judges in 1791. In
addition, by resting her constitutional argument on these more fundamental concepts,
Professor Thomas could have avoided the mistake which forms the premise of this article,
which is that not all summary judgments are the same. Thus, although I am somewhat
inclined to agree with Professor Thomas that a judge cannot constitutionally enter
summary judgment based on the judge's own views of the likelihood of the underlying
facts from the record assembled by the parties, I cannot agree with her that summary
judgment-as a procedure-is unconstitutional. The issue is more nuanced than her
broad conclusion suggests because the entry of summary judgments can be based on any
one of three different types of analyses.
In any event, my objective in this article is not to lend my support to Professor
Thomas on the issues with which she and I are probably in agreement; rather, my aim is to
express my disagreement with her broad conclusions regarding the unconstitutionality of
summary judgment in all instances. And, the astute reader will notice that I have taken
both the bird's eye view and the down-in-the-trenches approach to advancing this
argument. In Parts III.A-B, I engage Professor Thomas in the trenches, describing actual
common law cases in which a court precluded a plaintiff from getting to a jury on a
confidence analysis. In Part III.C, I take the bird's eye view of the issue and make the
rather straight-forward point that a confidence analysis (similar to an evidentiary
presumption or the laws of evidence) does not intrude upon the jury's ability to act as the
ultimate decision-maker with regard to what happened between the parties. I lead with
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
IV. The Constitutionality of a Confidence Theory of Summary
Judgment: Supreme Court Case Law
In considering the constitutionality of the confidence theory of
summary judgment, it is (of course) also important to consider
existing Supreme Court caselaw. The Supreme Court has decided
four "modern"' 5 ° cases that are generally perceived as relevant to the
constitutionality of summary judgment: Fidelity;' Slocum v. New
York Life Insurance Co.;'52 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman;5. and Galloway.' The conventional wisdom is that these
four cases, along with the Supreme Court's subsequent
characterization of the Fidelity holding in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore,'55 establish that summary judgment is constitutional.'
This conventional wisdom supports my argument: If summary
judgment, in toto, has been determined constitutional, the confidence
the historical only because that style of argument responds most directly to the style of
argument advanced by Professor Thomas.
150. Supreme Court case law regarding the scope of the Seventh Amendment does
not begin with the twentieth-century cases discussed in this paper. In many instances this
older case law is difficult to digest because of the different procedures and terminology
involved. See, e.g., Barney v. Schmeider, 76 U.S. 248 (1869) (discussing the
constitutionality under the Seventh Amendment of a judge's "directed verdict," which
involved instructing the jury on what their conclusion should be, rather than the modern
use of the same term that involves a judge's entry of judgment without a jury). In any
event, the twentieth-century case law examined in this article is sufficient to support my
thesis, which is that the use of a confidence analysis at the summary judgment stage is
consistent with the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, the twentieth-century case law is also
sufficient to support a secondary aim of this article, which is to lend support to Professor
Thomas's argument (properly cabined) that the current justifications for the
constitutionality of a probability theory of summary judgment are inadequate. These
inadequate justifications for the constitutionality of a probability theory of summary
judgment are based on the twentieth-century Supreme Court case law, see Thomas, supra
note 1, at n.96 (providing examples of those who conclude, from the twentieth-century
case law, that summary judgment is always constitutional), so refuting this case law
undermines the current justifications for the probability theory of summary judgment.
151. Fidelity, 187 U.S. 315.
152. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
153. Redman, 295 U.S. 654.
154. Galloway, 319 U.S. 372.
155. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
156. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2714 ("[T]here have been few cases
under Rule 56 that have questioned its constitutionality. Rather, most courts simply have
stated that the rule was not intended to deprive a party of a jury trial."); EDWARD
BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW & PRACTICE 20 (3d ed. 2006)
("[T]he Supreme Court unequivocally upheld the constitutional validity of summary
judgment."); Miller, supra note 26, at 1019 n.204 (2002) (stating that the constitutionality
of summary judgment has been "well-accepted" after the Court's Fidelity opinion).
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theory of summary judgment with which I am concerned here would
also, de facto, be constitutional. I will not rely on this conventional
wisdom, however. Professor Thomas has, in my view, advanced a
persuasive attack on the conventional wisdom that presumes
summary judgment is constitutional in all instances. As will be
evident below, I agree with some of Professor Thomas's arguments.
Despite my agreement with some of what Professor Thomas says
regarding the existing Supreme Court caselaw, both her analysis and
the conventional wisdom that Thomas attacks are impaired by a
defect: The presumption that all summary judgments are created
equal and decided under the same rationale. This assumption is
incorrect, as discussed previously in this article: A court might enter
summary judgment based on any of three different rationales or
theories. Each of these three different types of analyses must be
considered separately when evaluating the Seventh Amendment
issue.
By appreciating that not every summary judgment is created the
same, the existing Supreme Court case law can be read from a
completely different perspective. This new perspective confirms that
summary judgments based on a confidence analysis are constitutional.
Most surprisingly, though, this fresh perspective also supports
Professor Thomas's (properly narrowed) thesis: The Supreme Court
has never considered-let alone confirmed-the constitutionality of
summary judgments made under a probability analysis.
A. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States
The starting point in considering Supreme Court case law on the
constitutionality of summary judgment is Fidelity. The Fidelity case
supports the constitutionality of a confidence theory of summary
judgment. It does not, however, provide support for the
constitutionality of summary judgment in all its applications, as the
Court's subsequent citation to Fidelity in Parklane Hosiery would
suggest. To unravel all this from the Fidelity case requires some
careful attention and also a "page of history. ' 57
The Fidelity case involved a claim58 against Fidelity as a surety
on bonds.'59 The bonds were to ensure the performance of Peyton
157. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) ("A page of history is worth a
volume of logic.").
158. A claim had also been asserted directly against Peyton Vinson in the lower court
proceedings, but the claim against Vinson was not part of the proceedings in the United
States Supreme Court. See Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 316.
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Vinson in his contract to construct some public works on behalf of the
District of Columbia.'60 In addition to securing Vinson's performance
to the District of Columbia, the bond also protected third parties
subcontracted to work under Vinson by covenanting that Vinson
would "promptly make payments to all persons supplying him with
labor or materials in the prosecution of the work provided for.'
161
The bond was required, by Congressional statute, as a precondition to
working with the District of Columbia.1 62 According to the complaint
filed in Fidelity, Lewis Smoot had furnished Vinson with certain
materials used in the construction of the public works but had not
been paid for these materials.63 Smoot sought recovery from Fidelity
under the bond it had issued.
In addition to merely alleging these facts, however, Smoot also
filed an affidavit that swore to the facts contained in the complaint9
1
This was done to take advantage of Rule 73,165 which had been
adopted by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.'66 Rule 73
provided:
In any action rising ex contractu, if the plaintiff or his
agent shall have filed, at the time of bringing his
action, an affidavit setting out distinctly his cause of
action.., he shall be entitled to a judgment for the
amount so claimed, with interest and costs, unless the
defendant shall file, along with his plea, if in bar, an
affidavit of defense denying the right of the plaintiff as
to the whole or some specified part of his claim, and
specifically stating also, in precise and distinct terms,
the grounds of his defense, which must be such as
would, if true, be sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's
claim in whole or in part.
167
159. See id.
160. See id; see also The Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 20 App. D.C. 376,
376 (1902).
161. Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 316.
162. See Fidelity, 20 App. D.C. at 376.
163. See Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 316.
164. See id. at 316-17.
165. D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 73.
166. See id. at 318-19.
167. Id. at 318 (quoting the Civ. R. 73).
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In response to the plaintiff's complaint and affidavit, the defendant
filed a general denial.68  In addition, pursuant to Rule 73, the
defendant also filed an affidavit. The affidavit stated, in relevant part,
that:
[T]he said defendant, its officers and agents, has no
personal knowledge of the contracts alleged in said
declaration to have been entered into by and between
Lewis E. Smoot and Peyton D. Vinson to said Smoot
under said alleged contracts; that the said defendant,
its officers and agents, has not sufficient information,
in the opinion of the affiant and of the counsel of said
defendants... to be safe in admitting or denying
under oath the allegations of said declaration in regard
to said contracts.69
Smoot then filed for "judgment',71 on the grounds that Fidelity's
affidavit was insufficient in not "specifically stating also, in precise
and distinct terms, the grounds of his defense.'171 This motion was
granted and judgment was entered for Smoot.'72 Fidelity appealed,
arguing, inter alia, that he had been denied his right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.
173
The United States Supreme Court rejected Smoot's argument
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.174 The Court stated:
If it were true that the rule deprived the plaintiff in
error of the right of trial by jury, we should pronounce
it void without reference to cases. But it does not do
so. It prescribes the means of making an issue. The
issue made as prescribed, the right of trial by jury
168. Seeid. at 317.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 318.
171. Id. at 317 (citing Civ. R. 73).
172. See id.
173. See id. Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state court
proceedings, the Amendment does apply to lower court proceedings (like those in
Fidelity) initiated in District of Columbia courts. See Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976,
978 (D.C. 1988) ("Although not incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Seventh Amendment is, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, fully
applicable to courts established by Congress in the District of Columbia.").
174. See Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 123.
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accrues. The purpose of the rule is to preserve the
court from frivolous defenses, and to defeat attempts
to use formal pleading as means to delay the recovery
of just demands .... It would seem a logical result of
the argument of plaintiff in error that there was a
constitutional right to old forms of procedure, and yet
it seems to be conceded that Congress has power to
change them, even to the enactment of rule 73.175
To fully appreciate what occurred in Fidelity, it is important to
understand the historical development of the procedure known as
"summary judgment.'' 176 As the 1937 Advisory Committee Notes on
Rule 56 make clear, the procedure known as "summary judgment"
can be traced to English practice in the nineteenth century.77 As this
procedure developed, both in England and in America, it assumed
certain characteristics. First, it was a procedure that was designed to
be used by plaintiffs;178 the perceived problem necessitating the
development of this particular procedure was that defendants were
manipulating the system so as to delay the satisfaction of meritorious
claims.79 Second, the procedure was usually limited to certain types
of claims. Broadly speaking, the claims for which a summary
175. Id. at 320-21.
176. For reasons that will become apparent to the reader, the development of the
procedure known as "summary judgment" should be distinguished from the discussion of
the English common law as it existed in 1791. For an impressive-and helpful-student
note discussing the development of the procedure known as summary judgment, see
generally Ilani Haramati, Note, Procedural History: The Development of Summary
Judgment as Rule 56, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 173 (2005).
177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56, Advisory Committee's Notes (1937) ("[The procedure
known as summary judgment] has been extensively used in England for more than 50
years and has been adopted in a number of American states."); see also Charles E. Clark
& Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 424 (1929) ("1855
marks the introduction into England of a summary judgment provision restricted in its
application to actions upon bills of exchange and promissory notes.").
178. See Clark, supra note 177, at 423 ("Under this procedure judgment may be
entered summarily for the plaintiff .... (emphasis added)); D. Michael Risinger, Honesty
in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with FRCP 11, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1976) (stating the early use of the procedure formally known as summary
judgment was for the plaintiff only).
179. See Clark, supra note 177, at 423 ("The reform is usually advocated because of its
effectiveness in preventing delays by defendants, and in securing speedy justice for
creditors."); J. Palmer Lockard, Summary Judgment in Pennsylvania: Time for Another
Look at Credibility Issues, 35 DuQ. L. REV. 625, 634 (1997) ("The early summary
judgment procedures were justified as a means for allowing creditors to obtain judgments
against recalcitrant debtors without enduring the delays associated with the normal
common law pleading process.").
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judgment was available to the 'plaintiff consisted of "actions for
recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money.' '18
In Fidelity, the judgment that Smoot sought against Fidelity,
under the District of Columbia's Rule 73, was consonant with the
typical use of the procedure known as summary judgment that had
developed under English law and in various American states."' The
suit was for recovery on a bond issued by the defendant, which was
generally the type of claim for which a summary judgment was
permitted. In addition, the plaintiff sought the pre-jury judgment
against the defendant.
But what does this claim-specific, plaintiff-only form of pre-jury
judgment have to do with modern summary judgment, which is not
claim-specific and which is used overwhelmingly by defendants rather
than plaintiffs?'" Much, as it turns out, at least for the particular type
of summary judgment with which this article is concerned-the
confidence theory of summary judgment.83 In order to appreciate
this point, though, it is best to momentarily suspend the effort to
compare the procedure in Fidelity to modern summary judgment and,
instead, to note the similarity of the procedure in Fidelity to another
modern procedure: the affirmative defense.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)'" provides a non-exhaustive
list of legal arguments known as affirmative defenses.8  A defendant
has the obligation to plead an affirmative defense and thus introduce
the issue into the litigation.18' Technically, the defendant's burden of
pleading an affirmative defense and introducing the issue into the
case does not necessary mean that the defendant has the burden of
production on that issue.'87 As a practical matter, though, the burden
180. Clark, supra note 177, at 424-25 (describing the English procedure of summary
judgment under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873).
181. See generally id. at 440-71 (tracing the development of the procedure known as
summary judgment in American state-law practice).
182. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 92 (1990) (describing modern summary judgment
as a "defendant's motion," and offering empirical evidence of this claim).
183. But see Thomas, supra note 1, at 166 n.113 (noting, as part of her effort to
distinguish Fidelity and undermine the importance of the case, the differences between the
procedure in Fidelity and modern summary judgment).
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
185. See id.; Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (stating that the list of affirmative
defenses in Rule 8(c) is not exhaustive).
186. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
187. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) ("Rule 8(c) covers only the
manner of pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is
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of producing evidence usually follows the burden of pleading,
meaning that if a party is obligated to raise a particular issue (under
the burden of pleading) that party will likely have the burden of
producing evidence to support what was pled (under the burden of
production)."' A party on whom there is a burden of production is
the party who suffers the consequences of failing to build an adequate
evidentiary record.
Usually, of course, a plaintiff has the burden of production. But
the procedural devices known as summary judgment that had first
arisen under English common law, and then eventually spread to
American common law (as in the Fidelity case), flipped this burden of
production. Thus, in the Fidelity case, because of the application of
Rule 73, Fidelity needed to do more than offer a general denial of the
plaintiff's claim: The defendant needed to introduce a defense into
the case and, moreover, offer proof in support of that defense in the
form of an affidavit "specifically stating also, in precise and distinct
terms, the grounds of his defense."18 9
By shifting the burden of both pleading and production in
Fidelity, Rule 73-which was very typical of the early procedures
known as "summary judgment"-shared much in common with the
modern notion of an affirmative defense. This analogy becomes even
more obvious when one considers the types of cases in which this
common law procedure known as summary judgment was available.
As alluded to above, the pre-Federal Rules form of summary
judgment was usually limited to "actions for recovery of debts or
liquidated demands in money."' 9  These types of claims usually
involved actions on negotiable instruments, whose value depended
upon the sanctity and integrity of the note itself.'91 Litigation in which
a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must
apply .... (citation omitted)).
188. See Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of Proof in Federal
Civil Actions-An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 892, 895 (1982) ("In the absence of a controlling statute, burdens of production
normally follow the rules of pleading."); cf. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204 ("The first question
presented centers on a conflict over whether exhaustion under the PLRA is a pleading
requirement the prisoner must satisfy in his complaint or an affirmative defense the
defendant must plead and prove.")
189. Civ. R. 73.
190. Clark, supra note 177, at 425 (describing the English procedure of summary
judgment under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873).
191. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 449 (1979) (discussing the concept of merger, under which "the
piece of paper on which the bill was written or printed should be treated as if it-the piece
of paper-was itself the claim or debt which it evidenced").
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the sanctity of the note was challenged, particularly by off-the-record
defenses, undermined the workings of this system. As stated in the
preamble to the English Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange
Act (1855): "Whereas bona fide holders of dishonored Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes are often unjustly delayed and put to
unnecessary Expense in recovering the Amount thereof by reason of
frivolous or fictitious Defences [sic] to Actions thereon, and it is
expedient that greater facilities than now exist should be given for the
Recovery of Money due on such Bills and Notes .... "
The reason that the early procedures known as summary
judgment shifted the burden of pleading and production to the
defendant in suits on negotiable instruments is strikingly similar to
the modern justifications for treating certain issues as affirmative
defenses that the defendant must plead and prove. Consider the
following from Charles Clark: "[J]ust as certain disfavored allegations
made by the plaintiff.., must be set forward with the greatest
particularity, so like disfavored defenses must be particularly alleged
by the defendant .... Again it may be an issue which may be
generally used for dilatory tactics .... ,193 Similarly, Professors
Charles Alan Wright and Arthur Miller state: "[T]he burden of
pleading should be put on the party who will be benefitted by
establishing a departure from the supposed legal or behavioral
norm."'' 4 Although Professors Wright and Miller are discussing the
modern procedure of affirmative defenses, they just as well could
have been discussing the early procedures known as summary
judgment; as stated above, the common law concerning negotiable
instruments depended upon the validity and integrity of the written
document, so refusing a holder in due course of the benefits of that
written document was very much "a departure from the supposed
legal or behavioral norm."'
192. English Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act (1855).
193. CLARK, supra note 21, at 609-10.
194. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1271, at 604.
195. Id.; see also Miller v. Race, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B.) 401, 402A; 1 Burr. 452,
457, 459 ("[Negotiable instruments] are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course
and transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind; which gives them the
credit and currency of money, to all intents and purposes.... A bank-note is constantly
and universally, both at home and abroad, treated as money, as cash; and paid and
received, as cash; and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their currency
should be established and secured."). The importance of protecting the integrity of
written negotiable instrument is perhaps best understood by considering that England did
not have an official paper currency in the eighteenth century. See WILLIAM H.
LAWRENCE, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 7
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Once one recognizes the similarity between the early procedures
known as summary judgment and the modern affirmative defense, the
importance of the Fidelity case to the constitutionality of modern
summary judgment can be recognized. The reason that summary
(2002) ("Throughout all of the eighteenth century, England did not have any official paper
currency, and several denominations of gold and silver coins were in short supply.
Increasing mercantile activities forced merchants to adopt money substitutes.
Consequently, drafts and notes came to be circulated widely through several hands before
ultimately being presented for payment or acceptance.").
Another justification sometimes given under modern law for treating a certain legal
issue as an affirmative defense is that the burden of introducing an issue and producing
evidence on the issue should fall on the party who is most likely to have access to the
pertinent information to that issue. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1271, at 603
("[A]ll or most of the relevant information on a particular element of a claim is within the
control of one party... and therefore that party should bear the burden of affirmatively
raising the matter."). This factor was clearly not present in Fidelity, as there is little reason
to doubt Fidelity's affidavit assertion that it had "no personal knowledge of the contracts
alleged in said declaration to have been entered into by and between Lewis E. Smoot and
Peyton D. Vinson." Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 317. This explains one of the alternative
arguments which was asserted by Fidelity in the Supreme Court, that Smoot's claims were
not within "the spirit of [Rule 73], and that, it is urged, [Rule 73] intends only 'money
demands, pure and simple,' not contracts of suretyship or conditional obligations." Id. In
other words, the claim asserted by Smoot was not a straightforward demand on a
negotiable instrument (the integrity of which the law assumed), so the information needed
to determine the validity of Smoot's claim was clearly not in the possession of Fidelity.
Fidelity's argument becomes even more persuasive when one considers that the
underlying contract between Smoot and Vinson was oral rather than written. See Fidelity,
20 App. D.C. at 3. A case like Fidelity is a long way from the typical cases (a
straightforward claim under a negotiable instrument) under which the burden of proof and
production was originally shifted to the defendant. This is consistent with the historical
trend, though, which expanded the types of suits subject to the burden shifting of the
common law "summary judgment." See Haramati, supra note 176, at 176-84 (discussing
this trend). This expansion occurred primarily as the result of statutory direction, so
political motivations cannot be discounted as an explanation for this pro-plaintiff
expansion, particularly given the historical era (late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century) in which this statutory expansion occurred. Cf Roscoe Pound,
Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 308, 310-15 (1913)
(discussing the litigation process from a political-and pro-plaintiff-perspective). In any
event, by reading the transcript of the official meeting of the Advisory Committee
concerning the approach the Federal Rules would take with regard to summary judgment,
one is left with the unsettling impression that the Committee did not entirely appreciate or
understand why that burden shifting had been initially limited to only certain types of
claims. This issue will be explored in a future article.
Regardless of whether Fidelity was correct to argue-as a normative matter-that
the burden shifting of Rule 73 should not be applied to its claims, as a descriptive matter it
was settled that the rule applied to Smoot's claim against Fidelity. See Deane v. Echols, 2
App. D.C. 522, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (holding that an action ex contractu was a suit "upon
money demands pure and simple-actions for a liquidated and specific amount of
money... not actions for breach of contract, when that contract is for something else than
money."). Indeed, Fidelity conceded at the Supreme Court that Smoot's claims were
"within the letter of the law." Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 321.
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judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff in Fidelity was not
because the Court believed that the plaintiff's version of the facts was
highly probable, but that the defendant had not offered the necessary
evidence (an affidavit) to rebut the plaintiff's story. And, because
Rule 73 shifted this burden of production to the defendant, the
defendant had to suffer a summary judgment because of this lack of
evidence. Fidelity, then, was a straightforward application of the
confidence principle of summary judgment. This conclusion becomes
obvious once the burden shifting effect of Rule 73 is identified.
The Supreme Court in Fidelity, then, was on solid ground in
denying the defendant's Seventh Amendment argument. As
demonstrated previously in this Article, under English common law
in 1791 a judge could enter a pre-jury judgment (in the form of a
compulsory nonsuit) based on a conclusion that a party had not
assembled an adequate evidentiary record.196 Usually, of course, this
determination went against the plaintiff,1" as the plaintiff usually had
the burden of production. But, in Fidelity, because the burden of
production had been shifted to the defendant, the plaintiff was the
party who benefitted from the dearth of evidence. In Fidelity, and in
other cases decided under early procedure known as summary
judgment, the Court was not applying an analysis that was foreign to
the common law. Rather, the Court was simply applying the analysis
on behalf of a plaintiff rather than against a plaintiff. This is the true
legacy of the early procedures known as "summary judgment": The
real import of these early procedures is that-like a modern
affirmative defense-they shifted the burden of pleading and
production to the defendant; after this burden shifting, though, the
analysis expected of a judge in determining whether this burden of
production had been met was an analysis that was employed by
English judges under the common law as it existed in 1791.
The Fidelity case establishes the constitutionality of the type of
summary judgment (a confidence theory) with which this article is
concerned. That said, the citation to the Fidelity case by the Supreme
Court in Parklane Hosiery is misleading. In Parklane, the Court cited
Fidelity for the broad proposition that "summary judgment does not
196. See supra Part II.
197. The discussion of Syeds, 100 Eng. Rep. 1008, supra note 128, involves an English
common law case in which the burden of production had been shifted to the defendant
and, thus, the defendant suffered from the skimpy evidentiary record on a material fact to
the litigation.
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violate the Seventh Amendment."'198 Here, the Court is making the
same mistake for which I have criticized Professor Thomas, namely,
assuming that all summary judgments are the same. Although
Professor Thomas has broadly declared that summary judgment is
unconstitutional, her real focus is on the type of summary judgment in
which a judge determines from the record evidence that one party's
assertion of facts is highly unlikely; I have referred to this type of
analysis as a probability analysis. Once Thomas's arguments are
appropriately cabined, though, I agree with her that the Fidelity case
does not support the type of summary judgment with which she is
concerned.199 The Court in Fidelity did not engage in a probability
analysis, and thus the Fidelity decision does not determine the
constitutionality of this theory of summary judgment.
B. Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. and Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc v. Redman
The Supreme Court's decisions in Slocum and Redman might
also be considered relevant to the constitutionality of a confidence
theory of summary judgment. Granted, neither decision involved a
summary judgment; each decision involved an entry of judgment
after-and in contradiction to-a jury verdict (under existing
nomenclature, this would be termed a "judgment as a matter of
law"2°). That said, one of the guiding principles of this article is that
the Seventh Amendment requires consideration of the type of
analysis used by a judge rather than the name of the procedure under
which that analysis was conducted; substance, rather than form, is
paramount. In Slocum and Redman, however, it turns out that this
difference in procedure is important to the constitutional inquiry.
Because both Slocum and Redman involved post-jury verdicts, the
second clause of the Seventh Amendment-usually referred to as the
198. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). The Court's
citation to-and description of-the Fidelity decision in Parklane can be understood by
realizing that the Court in Parklane was merely attempting to make a broader point about
the flexibility provided under the Seventh Amendment to experiment and deviate from
the exact procedural tools existing under English common law. On this broad issue, the
Fidelity decision was directly on point, as it involved a procedure-foreign to the common
law in 1791-that shifted the burden of pleading and production to the defendant.
199. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 164-66 (arguing that the Court in Fidelity did not
engage in an analysis of the probability of the material facts in dispute).
200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (providing for judgment as a matter of law before
submission to a jury, and also providing for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict
so long as the motion was made before submission to the jury).
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Re-Examination Clause2°'-was triggered. Because the Court's
decision in Redman was based solely on the Re-Examination Clause
of the Seventh Amendment, and because the Redman Court
characterized the Slocum decision as being based solely on the Re-
Examination Clause, these decisions have no relevance to summary
judgment. Because summary judgment occurs in advance of a jury
verdict, summary judgment is not subject to the Re-Examination
Clause of the Seventh Amendment and is instead controlled only by
the first clause of the Seventh Amendment (sometimes referred to as
the Preservation Clause°").
The Slocum litigation involved a suit to recover on a life
insurance policy.' The plaintiff was the wife of the insured)4 The
question in the case was whether the policy had lapsed before the
death of the insured.25 The insurance company moved for a directed
verdict before the case was submitted to the jury, which was denied
by the trial court .2  The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and
the insurance company moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, which was denied by the trial court.2 7  The insurance
company then appealed to the Third Circuit,2 8 which determined that
it was error for the district court to deny the insurance company's
motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.209 The Third Circuit then ordered that judgment be entered
on behalf of the defendant." The Supreme Court determined that
the Third Circuit's conclusion that the defendant was entitled to
judgment violated the Seventh Amendment, and that the appropriate
remedy was to order a new trial in the case.211
The Redman litigation involved a negligence claim by a cook for
injuries sustained while working on defendant's ship. 2 At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a
201. See Sward, supra note 41, at 584.
202. See id.
203. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 366-368.
204. Id. at 367.
205. Id. at 367-368.
206. Id. at 368.
207. Id. at 368-69.
208. Id. at 369. The initial suit had been filed in federal court in the Western District
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 366.
209. Id. at 369.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 376-400.
212. See Redman v. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 70 F.2d 635,636 (2nd Cir. 1934).
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directed verdict, but the trial court reserved its decision on this
motion and submitted the case to the jury.213 The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff; at this point the trial court denied the
defendant's motion and entered judgment for the plaintiff. 14 The
defendant appealed to the Second Circuit."' The Second Circuit
determined that the defendant's motion should have been granted
initially.2 16 Because the case had been submitted to the jury, however,
the Second Circuit concluded that it was precluded, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Slocum, from granting any relief other
than awarding the defendant a new trial. 17
The Supreme Court in Redman reversed the Second Circuit on
this point, distinguishing Slocum. In Slocum, the Court noted, the
defendant's request for a directed verdict had been denied, and no
attempt was made to reserve or preserve this question pending the
jury's decision.218 The Redman Court's characterization of the Slocum
decision is critical in the sense that it restricts the scope of the Slocum
decision: According to the Redman court, the problem in Slocum was
not the type of analysis used by the lower court in reversing the jury
verdict. Rather, the constitutional problem was that this analysis had
occurred after the jury had reached a verdict and that the
consideration of this question had not been explicitly reserved by the
judge before sending the case to the jury. In Redman, the trial court
judge had reserved this question and thus-according to the Redman
court-the constitutional defect involved in Slocum had been cured.
Under this reading of the cases, then, the only Seventh Amendment
issue that was resolved in Slocum related to the timing of the judge's
decisions. The timing issue only comes up under the second clause
(the Re-Examination Clause) of the Seventh Amendment, italicized
below:
In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
213. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
214. See id.




218. See id. at 658.
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United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.219
To further illustrate this point, one can consider the two clauses of the
Seventh Amendment across a timeline, which is provided below in
Figure D. The Preservation Clause protects the basic right to a trial
by jury and applies to any judge-made determination-either before
or after the rendition of a jury's verdict-that intrudes upon this right.
The Re-Examination Clause does not duplicate the rights guaranteed
under the Preservation Clause, but rather offers additional rights that









The narrow interpretation of Slocum in Redman not only defined
the contours of the Slocum decision, but also determined the
parameters of the Redman decision. In Redman, the Court did not
determine whether the Preservation Clause allowed the Third Circuit
to conclude that "the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
for the plaintiff. ' 20 The Court's constitutional analysis was centered
219. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
220. Redman, 295 U.S. at 659. The Redman Court does note that the Third Circuit's
decision on this question "was right," id., but this conclusion should not be understood to
have a constitutional dimension. The Redman decision preceded the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and thus the procedural rules applied in the lower court were those of the
state of New York, which was the state in which the federal district court sat. See id. at
661. Thus, the Court's conclusion that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict
should be viewed as simply a finding that the lower court's conclusion regarding the
"sufficiency of the evidence" was a correct application of New York procedural rules.
Furthermore, the Redman Court had granted certiorari only on the question of whether
the Third Circuit could enter judgment for the defendant or was limited to relief in the
form of a new trial; the Court had explicitly denied certiorari on the question of whether
the evidence in that particular case required a determination. See id. at 656. In this sense,
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only on the effect of the jury's verdict rather than the analysis used by
the lower court in determining that the jury's decision was wrong. In
other words, the Redman Court defined the Slocum decision narrowly
as being based only on the Re-Examination Clause, and then
proceeded to distinguish Slocum as to the narrow grounds on which
the Slocum decision was based.
By defining Slocum in such a narrow manner, and then
distinguishing Slocum on the technical basis of whether the
defendant's motion had been reserved by the trial court before
submission to the jury, the Redman Court determined that the only
Seventh Amendment issue that was resolved in these two cases
concerned the Re-Examination Clause. The manner in which the
Redman Court distinguished the Slocum decision effectively
eviscerates the independent relevance of the Re-Examination Clause.
Because a trial court judge can make any decision-and give any
relief-after a jury verdict that could be done before a jury verdict, as
long as the decision has been "reserved" by the court, the Re-
Examination Clause can be avoided so long as this technicality is
complied with.22' That said, what is most important for present
purposes (the constitutionality of summary judgment) is what these
two decisions do not resolve: the general relationship between judge
and jury required under the Preservation Clause.
Another way in which to consider the limited scope of the
Redman and Slocum decisions is by considering a hypothetical
procedural rule that allows a trial court judge to enter judgment
against a party if the judge believes that the party's witnesses are
probably lying. Obviously, this procedural rule-by explicitly
then, the Court's conclusion that the Third Circuit "was right" might be understood as
simply denoting that this issue was not before the court.
If the Redman decision was viewed as determining both the constitutionality of the
type of analysis used by the lower court (Preservation Clause) and the timing of that
decision (Re-Examination Clause), the Redman decision would completely undermine the
arguments advanced by Professor Thomas, because it is abundantly clear in Redman (as
opposed to Slocum) that the circuit court was engaged in a probability analysis. The
majority opinion for the Second Circuit discussed the plethora of evidence that
undermines the believability of the "uncorroborated story of the plaintiff." See Redman,
70 F.2d at 637. Both the majority opinion and dissenting opinions of the Second Circuit in
Redman read like a lawyer's summations to the jury rather than a court's legal analysis.
221. Numerous commentators have noted this consequence of the Slocum and
Redman decisions. See, e.g., Roger Kirst, Judicial Control of Punitive Damage Verdicts: A
Seventh Amendment Perspective, 48 SMU. L. REV. 63, 70 (1994) ("The holding of Slocum
has little effect on modern procedure, because it was circumvented later in Redman, but
an occasional litigant is reminded of it when they forget to make a timely motion for a
directed verdict or the renamed judgment as a matter of law.").
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allowing a judge to weigh the credibility of witnesses-would violate
the Seventh Amendment. Merely requiring the judge to reserve a
decision on this basis until after a jury verdict could not cure this
constitutional deficiency. Of course, requiring the judge to reserve
the decision would negate any problems under the Re-Examination
Clause, as that Clause was interpreted in Slocum and Redman.
Nevertheless, this hypothetical rule would still be a violation of the
Preservation Clause because of the nature of the analysis it permits
rather than the timing of that analysis. The Redman court ignored the
serious constitutional question under the Preservation Clause by
focusing solely on the Re-Examination Clause and then proceeding to
distinguish the Slocum decision in a way that effectively gutted this
Clause.
Of course, the Redman Court's characterization of the Slocum
decision as occurring solely under the Re-Examination Clause is not
necessarily accurate. The Slocum Court, as part of its analysis, did
note that the court's entry of judgment had not occurred until after
the jury verdict." But the Slocum opinion also contains passages that
222. See, e.g., Slocum, 228 U.S. at 377 ("[T]he circuit court of appeals directed a
judgment for one party when the [jury] verdict was for the other .... "); id. at 377
("[A]ccording to the rules of the common law the facts once tried by a jury are never re-
examined, unless a new trial is granted in the discretion of the court, before which the suit
is pending...." (quoting United States v. Wonson, 1 Gall. 5, 20 (1812)); Slocum, 228 U.S.
at 399 ("I[T]he 7th Amendment... not only preserves the common-law right of trial by
jury.., but expressly forbids that issues of fact settled by such a trial shall be re-
examined .... ). The Slocum Court was not as conspicuous, however, in noting that the
trial court judge had not reserved the right to reconsider the defendant's motion after the
jury had returned a verdict, which, of course, was the basis of the ultimate distinction
drawn by the Redman Court. The Slocum Court mentions that the defendant had made a
motion for a directed verdict, which was denied, and then made a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which was also denied. See id. at 368-69. Considering the
importance assigned to this procedural nicety by the Redman Court, one would expect a
discussion of this issue to figure more prominently in the Slocum opinion if the Slocum
Court really believed that the Seventh Amendment violation in that case depended solely
on the timing of the analysis that the lower court had used in entering judgment. In other
words, if the Seventh Amendment violation in Slocum was based solely on the Re-
Examination Clause, and if the problem could be cured-as the Redman Court later
held-merely by reserving the decision on the defendant's directed verdict, it is extremely
odd that the Slocum Court did not focus on this procedural aspect of the trial court
proceedings in Slocum.
Of course, one explanation for the Slocum's avoidance of this issue is that the
Slocum Court did not anticipate-or agree with-the distinction made by Redman Court,
which effectively gutted much of the import of the Re-Examination Clause as a separate
clause in the Seventh Amendment. Cf 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, § 2522 (3d ed. 2008) (describing current Federal Rule of Procedure 50(b), which
makes automatic the reservation that served as the distinguishing factor in Redman and
Slocum, as a "fiction"); but see Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 477 (1830) (Story, J.)
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can be read to suggest that the constitutional infirmity in Slocum was
the type of analysis used by the lower courts (an issue under the
Preservation Clause) rather than the fact that this analysis occurred
after the rendition of a jury verdict (an issue solely under the Re-
Examination Clause). For instance, the Slocum opinion states:
[I]t is the province of the jury to hear the evidence and
by their verdict to settle the issues of fact, no matter
what the state of the evidence ... the court cannot
dispense with a verdict, or disregard one when given,
and itself pass on the issues of fact.... It is not a
question of whether the facts are difficult or easy of
ascertainment, but of the tribunal charged with their
ascertainment .... 223
("[T]he [Re-Examination Clause] of the amendment is still more important [than the
Preservation Clause]; and we read it as a substantial and independent clause."). The
Court will occasionally acknowledge that a Seventh Amendment argument made in a case
in which a jury verdict has already been rendered invokes the Re-Examination Clause.
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 2, at 188 (The Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions,
asserted that the two clauses are distinct and independent, yet the interpretive history of
one clause has sometimes been indiscriminately applied to the other."). Despite this lip-
service to the distinction, if the Re-Examination Clause can be neutered by the simple act
of reserving a decision that might be made before the rendition of a jury verdict, the
practical import of the Re-Examination Clause is destroyed.
Another explanation for the Slocum's Court failure to mention the procedural
nicety which formed the basis of the Redman decision, however, is that the Slocum
decision was based on the type of analysis performed by the lower court rather than the
fact that this analysis had occurred after the rendition of a jury verdict. In other words,
the Slocum Court might have perceived of the Seventh Amendment problem in Slocum as
occurring under the Preservation Clause rather than the Re-Examination Clause. As
discussed in the text, there are other reasons to believe that, in reality, the Slocum Court
was concerned with the type of analysis performed by the lower court rather than the fact
that this analysis had occurred after a jury verdict.
223. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 387-88; see also id. at 376 (stating that the lower court
"assumed to pass finally upon the issues of fact presented by the pleadings and to direct a
judgment accordingly"). Adding to the difficulty in pinpointing the precise holding in the
somewhat verbose Slocum opinion is that the nature of the lower court's analysis in
entering judgment for the defendant is not entirely clear. Recall, in Part II of this article,
the three different types of analysis on which a summary judgment might be based. The
Third Circuit's judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not seem to be based on a
confidence analysis, but could be viewed as turning on either a probability analysis or an
application of law to settled facts. The dispositive question in Slocum was whether the
decedent's insurance policy had lapsed. See id. at 366-67. This question turned on
whether the defendant had waived the right to terminate the policy by accepting a partial
payment. See id. at 375. This resolution of this question, though, might be viewed as
turning on a question of fact or a question of law. For instance, according to the dissenting
judge in the Third Circuit, the legal analysis in the case necessarily required a factual
determination as to whether the plaintiff had been subjectively misled by the defendant's
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In any event, regardless of the actual, original basis of the Slocum
decision, the effect to be given the Slocum decision was clearly
resolved in Redman. The Redman Court characterized the Slocum
decision as being dependent on the fact that the court had not
reserved decision on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict 24
Because the trial court, in Redman, had reserved its decision on the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict before sending the case to
the jury, the Redman litigation was outside the narrowly defined
scope of the Slocum decision.25 The Redman Court admitted that the
Slocum decision could be read in broader terms, but resolved that the
Slocum decision must be read in the narrow way in which it had been
interpreted in Redman:
But it is true that some parts of the opinion in that
case give color to the interpretation put on it by the
court of appeals. In this they go beyond the case then
under consideration and are not controlling. Not only
agent with regard to the legal effect of her partial payment. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Slocum, 177 F. 842, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1910) (Buffington, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]hether the
agent had exercised [his delegated power] in a way to mislead the insured was not a
question of law for the court, but purely of fact, and therefore for the jury."). On the
other hand, the majority opinion for the Third Circuit seemed to believe that a legal
victory for the defendant was required on the basis of the facts that were not disputed. See
id. at 848 ("[W]e cannot hold the insurance company to have waived a provision of its
contract, by reason of an act of one of its agents, when that contract expressly declared
that the agent had no authority to do the thing he has done."). Thus, Slocum might be a
case in which the real dispute at the Circuit Court was simply over the nature of the
inquiry required by the substantive law, with the dissent believing that the substantive law
required consideration of a historical fact while the majority believing that the case could
be resolved by applying law to undisputed facts.
In any event, the Supreme Court's description of the litigation in Slocum definitely
adds to the confusion. The Court's opinion oscillates between describing the litigation as
requiring either a legal analysis or a factual inquiry. See, e.g., Slocum, 228 U.S. at 380
(describing the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant's motion as an "error[] of law");
id. at 376 (stating that the Third Circuit "assumed to pass finally upon the issues of fact
presented by the pleadings and to direct a judgment accordingly."). Perhaps the only
thing that can be stated with confidence regarding the Slocum litigation is that there is
substantial uncertainty as to the underlying reason or reasons supporting the defendant's
motion.
224. Redman, 295 U.S. at 658.
225. See id. at 658-59 ("The trial court expressly reserved its ruling on the defendant's
motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict, both of which were based on the asserted
insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff.").
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so, but they must be regarded as qualified by what is
said in this opinion.226
The Redman Court's characterization of Slocum, and the
Redman Court's limited Seventh Amendment analysis, which
consisted only of distinguishing the Slocum case on the Re-
Examination Clause issue, necessarily means that these two cases are
irrelevant in considering the constitutionality of summary judgment.
Both Slocum and Redman were decided under the Re-Examination
Clause; because summary judgment involves a decision by a trial
court judge before the rendition of a jury verdict, the Re-Examination
Clause is inapplicable to it.227
226. Id. at 661.
227. The conclusion reached in this section supports Professor Thomas's argument
(properly cabined) that the constitutionality of a probability theory of summary judgment
had not been decided. Professor Thomas, however, deals with Slocum and Redman in an
entirely different way than how these two cases are treated in this paper. Professor
Thomas does not distinguish between the Re-Examination Clause and the Preservation
Clause. Rather, Professor Thomas seeks to undermine the holding of Redman by
describing it as contradictory to the decision in Slocum. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 176
(stating that the decision in Slocum was "correct" and that the Redman Court's "reversal"
of Slocum "do[es] not support the constitutionality of summary judgment"). On one level,
I am sympathetic to the argument that the Slocum Court's determination that there was a
Seventh Amendment violation was based on broader principles than the narrow
interpretation given to Slocum by Redman. That said, the narrow construction given to
Slocum by Redman--even if this narrow construction is not faithful to the Slocum
opinion-does not undermine Professor Thomas's arguments regarding the
constitutionality of the probability theory of summary judgment, if one distinguishes
between the Preservation Clause and the Re-Examination Clause. Thus, I believe the
arguments advanced in this section are more persuasive than the ones asserted by
Professor Thomas. Professor Thomas's argument depends on these two cases being
irreconcilable and Slocum being "right" and Redman being "wrong." And, concededly,
most commentators view these two cases as being irreconcilable. See, e.g., Mark D.
Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1086 n.167 (2010)
("Redman was an abrupt break with the Slocum decision discussed above, which only
twenty years before had held precisely the opposite."); Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh
Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Givith and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 264 (2002) (saying that, in Redman, the Court
"virtually overruled" Slocum). These interpretations, though, ignore the analytical effect
of the manner in which the Redman Court distinguished the Slocum decision. In reality,
according to the Court's analysis in Redman, both Slocum and Redman are irrelevant to
the constitutionality of summary judgment. I believe the Court probably erred in reducing
the Re-Examination Clause to a mere technicality, but in any event the necessary
consequence of the actual holding in Redman is to leave open the broader question
regarding the constitutionality of the type of analysis a judge engages in when he grants
summary judgment before a jury verdict.
For an excellent examination of the case law precedent cited in Redman, see Sward,
supra note 41, at 613-24. Although Professor Sward does not distinguish, as this article
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C. Galloway v. United States
The Galloway case is directly on point for the specific issue
considered in this article, which is the constitutionality of a
confidence theory of summary judgment."' In Galloway, the Court
considered a Seventh Amendment challenge to a district court's
directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Like the Fidelity case
considered previously, but unlike Slocum and Redman, the dispositive
judge-made decision in the Galloway litigation occurred before the
rendition of a jury verdict, and thus the Court's constitutional analysis
in Galloway was necessarily under the Preservation Clause rather
than the Re-Examination Clause. Moreover, the directed verdict in
Galloway was granted pursuant to a confidence analysis: The critical
defect in the plaintiff's case was not that the trial court doubted the
probability of the facts alleged by the plaintiff, but rather that there
was a lack of adequate information from which to determine this
question. Thus, because Galloway affirmed the constitutional validity
of a confidence analysis at the directed-verdict stage, and there is no
constitutional reason to distinguish a confidence analysis in a directed
verdict from a confidence analysis in a summary judgment, Galloway
supports the constitutionality of a summary judgment based on a
confidence analysis. Because Galloway was decided under a
confidence analysis, though, it does not resolve-or even address-
the constitutionality of a probability theory of summary judgment,
which is the type of summary judgment that concerns Professor
Thomas.
The Galloway litigation involved a suit by Galloway, a war
veteran, seeking benefits under the War Risk Insurance Act.229 The
has done, between the Re-Examination Clause and the Preservation Clause in discussing
Redman, her primary thesis does support the one advanced by myself and by Professor
Thomas, which is that the Redman case should not be read to support the notion that
there is no Seventh Amendment prohibition against a judge entering judgment based on
the judge's own views of the evidence. Professor Sward approaches this question from a
slightly different angle, in that she criticizes the case law cited by the Court as not
supporting the broad interpretation that has been assigned to the Redman decision. See
id. at 623-24 ("This survey of cases reveals that Redman, like Munson, read far too much
into the cases upon which it relied. While English common law practice had a procedure
whereby jury verdicts could be taken subject to later decisions by the court on questions of
law, the reserved questions in the English cases really were questions of law. Eighteenth
century English judges surely would be surprised to see Redman decided by the court as if
no dispute of fact existed."). Of course, under my view, the Court in Redman was not
considering this broader question under the Preservation Clause, so it is not surprising that
the case law cited in Redman does not address this broader issue.
228. Galloway, 319 U.S. 372.
229. Id. at 373 n.1.
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suit was not filed until June 15, 1938, when Galloway was conceded to
be insane.2 3 The question, however, was whether Galloway was
totally and permanently disabled on May 31, 1919, when his policy
lapsed for nonpayment of premiums."' The suit was filed in federal
district court in California,232 and at the close of evidence the
Government (the defendant-insurer) moved for a directed verdict.233
The trial court granted the directed verdict, and Galloway appealed.2"
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.25  The Supreme Court considered
whether these decisions "deprived [Galloway] of trial by jury,
contrary to the Seventh Amendment."'236
The Court determined that Galloway's Seventh Amendment
rights had not been violated by the district court's directed verdict.
The deficiency in Galloway's case, according to the Court, was that
there was inadequate evidence as to Galloway's behavior between the
years of 1925 and 1930.237 Although Galloway had produced evidence
as to Galloway's condition before 1925 and after 1930,238 all that was
230. Id. at 373-74.
231. Id. at 372.
232. See Galloway v. United States, 130 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1942).
233. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 373. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not go into effect until September 16, 1938 (three months after the suit was filed), the trial
court proceedings were presumably not conducted under the modern Rules. See McCrone
v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 65 (1939) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
became effective on September 16, 1938). In the Supreme Court's Galloway opinion, the
Court mentions the recent promulgation of Rule 50 (allowing for directed verdicts) but
does not indicate that this Rule was applied in the lower court proceedings. See Galloway,
319 U.S. at 389.
234. See id. at 373.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 385-87 (discussing the absence of evidence regarding the years 1925 to
1930). There is an interesting question, under the substantive law, as to whether
Galloway's behavior after the year 1919 (when the policy expired) should be considered in
determining whether Galloway was "totally and permanently disabled" in 1919. Under
one view of this tricky question, the task in 1938 was to try to recreate whether, in the year
1919, Galloway would have been considered totally and permanently disabled at that time,
with Galloway's subsequent behavior being irrelevant to the issue. The other view is that,
because the statute required a "permanent" disability, the time period between the lapse
of the policy and the initiation of the lawsuit should be used as a potential source of
additional information as to whether the claimant was really permanently disabled on that
prior date. In Galloway, the Supreme Court ook the latter view by, in essence, slightly
morphing the inquiry to ask whether Galloway had a "continuous disability." Id. at 386;
see also id. at 383-84 (stating that Galloway must show that his disability "continuously
existed or progressed" from the lapse of the policy to the clear evidence demonstrating his
insanity after 1930).
238. See id. at 373-86 (discussing the evidentiary record in the case).
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known of Galloway's behavior and condition between 1925 and 1930
was that he had been married during this time period.239 Because the
Court believed that Galloway was required to demonstrate a
"continuous240 disability after the year 1919,24' this absence of
evidence was critical to Galloway's suit: "His was the burden to show
continuous disability. What he did in this time, or did not do, was
vital to his case. Apart from the mere fact of his marriage, the record
is blank for five years and almost blank for eight.
2 42
It is clear that the Supreme Court was applying a confidence
analysis in the Galloway case. It is not that the Court doubted
Galloway's claim that he was continuously disabled in the years 1925
to 1930, it was that there simply was not any information from which
to make this determination: "For all that appears, he may have
worked full time and continuously for five and perhaps for eight
[years.]2 43 That Galloway should suffer from this lack of evidence
was further supported by the fact that Galloway was in the best
position to supply this evidence: "Knowledge of [Galloway's]
activities and behavior from [] 1925 to 1930 was peculiarly within his
ken .. ,244
The Galloway Court then proceeded to consider the
constitutionality, under the Seventh Amendment, of the directed
verdict it had affirmed. On this point, the opinion in Galloway is
somewhat muddled. The Court first engages in an analysis comparing
the directed verdict to the common law procedures of a demurrer to
the evidence and a motion for a new trial.245 The Court acknowledges
that neither of these procedures is an exact replica of the modern
directed verdict,246 but concludes that the Seventh Amendment does
239. The Court noted, with perhaps a touch of humor, that Galloway's marriage was
"an act from which in the legal sense no inference of insanity can be drawn." Id. at 385.
240. Id. at 386.
241. Id. at 382-83.
242. Id. at 386.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see also Meier, supra note 4 (discussing how a confidence inquiry might be
informed by considering which party has the best access to the missing evidence). In their
briefs to the Supreme Court, Galloway's attorneys relied on a presumption to argue that
the lack of evidence as to the years 1925 to 1930 was the Government's problem. See
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8m, Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (No. 553)
(citing cases for the presumption that "[i]nsanity, being proved, is presumed to
continue."). Recall the discussion in this Article comparing an evidentiary presumption to
a confidence analysis. See supra Part III.B.
245. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 389-94.
246. Id. at 392-94.
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"not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or
details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791.247 In
addition, the Court briefly considers its prior caselaw, which it
apparently believes forecloses the constitutional argument being
advanced.248 What is missing from the Court's analysis in Galloway,
247. Id. at 390. In addition to concluding that the lack of a direct procedural
antecedent for the directed verdict is unimportant, the Court also engaged in a somewhat
confusing analysis that attempts to deduce the constitutionality of the directed verdict
from the collective attributes of the demurrer to the evidence and the motion for a new
trial. See id. at 392-95. This analysis is effectively critiqued by Professor Thomas. See
Thomas, supra note 1, at 169-71. To be fair to the Court in Galloway, the Court's analysis
on this point was in response to an argument asserted by Galloway. Galloway, 319 U.S. at
392 ("This difficulty, no doubt, accounts for the amorphous character of the objection now
advanced ....").
248. See id. at 389 & n.19 (citing prior Supreme Court case law and concluding that
Galloway's "objection therefore comes too late"). For an excellent and thorough review
of the case law cited by the Supreme Court in Galloway, see Sward, supra note 41, at 599-
613. Sward's conclusion with regard to the case law cited by the Court is that it does not
support the conclusion that Sward (like Thomas) attributed to the Galloway decision,
which is that the Court concluded that a directed verdict was appropriate because there
was only one reasonable inference from the evidence that could be made on the critical
fact questions implicated by the suit. See id. at 600 ("First, unlike the cases discussed
earlier, Galloway approved a procedure that took a disputed question of fact out of the
hands of the jury."); id. at 603 ("The issue in Galloway could not be classified as anything
other than a question of fact[.] Yet the Court treated it as a question of law, holding that
there was only one 'reasonable' inference from the facts"). Sward's interpretation of the
Galloway decision results from a failure to distinguish between probability and
confidence; this is most pointedly demonstrated in the following statement by Sward: "The
Court found that the plaintiff should have been able to produce evidence as to his
condition between 1925 and 1930, and his failure to do so could lead only to the conclusion
that he was sane during those years." Id. at 601. Sward is correct to note that that the
problem was the lack of evidence, but the mistake is in assuming that the lack of evidence
meant that the plaintiff was, as a matter of probability, sane during those years. Rather,
the analysis of the Court in Galloway was premised on the lack of evidence and legal
consequences from this lack of evidence. Recall that, under the common law, when a
judge entered a nonsuit against a plaintiff based on a confidence analysis, the plaintiff was
free to bring suit again because nothing about the merits of the plaintiff's case had been
decided. See supra note 66 (explaining this aspect of the common law nonsuit and also
explaining why, under modem law with abundant opportunities for discovery, a
confidence analysis does result in a judgment that has prejudicial effect). Because
Professor Sward fails to distinguish between probability and confidence, she errs in
concluding that "[a]fter Galloway, fact has become law." See Sward, supra note 41, at 603.
In any event, once the true basis of Galloway's decision is sorted out, Professor
Sward's meticulous analysis of the case law cited by the Court in Galloway does show that
the Court had, on some occasions, used a confidence analysis as the basis for court-
ordered judgment in lieu of a jury verdict. See id. at 604 (discussing Parks v. Ross and
concluding that, in Parks, "there was no evidence to weigh."); id. at 605 (analyzing
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442 (1872), and concluding that Munson "was
primarily a ruling on evidence: whether the court should allow the jury to infer a fact when
to do so would be inconsistent with the court's ruling on an evidentiary presumption").
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of course, is a review of English common law cases in which a judge,
pursuant to a confidence analysis, prevented a case from proceeding
to a jury for a verdict; the Court would have been well served in
Galloway to analyze the cases included in Part IV of this Article.
Despite the somewhat muddled analysis in Galloway, the holding
clearly confirms the result the Court had previously reached in
Fidelity: The Seventh Amendment does not prohibit a judge from
determining that there is not a sufficient quantity of evidence to allow
the case to proceed to a jury for resolution of a disputed fact. As the
Court stated in Galloway, the "essential requirement" of a confidence
analysis "is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for
probative facts."'249 The Seventh Amendment permits judges to
engage in this confidence inquiry:
[W]e are unable to conclude that one whose burden,
by the nature of his claim, is to show continuing and
total disability for nearly twenty years supplies the
essential proof of continuity when he wholly omits to
show his whereabouts, activities or condition for five
years, although the record discloses evidence must
have been available, and, further, throws no light upon
three additional years, except for one vaguely
described and dated visit to his former home. Nothing
in the Seventh Amendment requires it should be
allowed to join forces with the jury system to bring
about such a result. That guaranty requires that the
jury be allowed to make reasonable inferences from
facts proven in evidence having a reasonable tendency
to sustain them. It permits expert opinion to have the
force of fact when based on facts which sustain it. But
it does not require that experts or the jury be
permitted to make inferences from the withholding of
crucial facts.9 '
For Seventh Amendment purposes, there is no reason to
distinguish between a case terminated, pursuant o a confidence
analysis, at the summary judgment stage or the directed verdict stage.
Thus, the Court's decision in Galloway confirming the use of a
249. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 395.
250. Id. at 396.
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confidence theory at the directed verdict stage also supports the
constitutionality of this same analysis at the summary judgment stage.
Notice, however, that recognizing Galloway as a case upholding
the confidence theory of summary judgment also supports Professor
Thomas's thesis (properly cabined) that the Seventh Amendment
prevents a court from using a probability theory to resolve a case on
summary judgment. The Galloway opinion, like the Fidelity opinion
before it, did not resolve that issue because a probability analysis was
not involved in the case.
Conclusion
In applying the historical test required under current Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence, it is imperative to remember that the
Seventh Amendment does "not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common
law in 1791.251 Instead, it is necessary to consider the type of analysis
a judge has used in resolving a particular case.
Along these lines, it is inaccurate to speak broadly of "the
constitutionality of summary judgment." Modern courts enter
summary judgment according to three different types of analyses, and
each of these three types of analysis require a different Seventh
Amendment inquiry. One such analysis is a confidence analysis.
Under this analysis, a court determines that there is not an adequate
amount of evidence to allow the jury to determine the probability of
the material facts to the litigation.
When a judge enters summary judgment according to a
confidence analysis, there is no constitutional deprivation of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. English common law courts
sometimes used a confidence analysis as the basis of a compulsory
nonsuit against the plaintiff. When this occurred, the plaintiff's claim
was terminated before a jury verdict could be rendered, although the
plaintiff was free to bring his case against if additional evidence was
located.
Moreover, the modern Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms
the constitutionality of a summary judgment entered on a confidence
theory. In Fidelity, the Court entered a summary judgment based on
a confidence theory, although this conclusion is somewhat obscured
by the fact that the burden of production in that case was on the
defendant rather than the plaintiff. Similarly, in Galloway, the Court
251. Id. at 390.
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confirmed the use of a confidence theory at the directed verdict stage,
which further supports the constitutionality of this analysis at the
summary judgment stage. A similar analogy, however, cannot be
drawn between summary judgment and the Court's conclusions in
Slocum and Redman, both of which involved a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Each of these cases involved the second
clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Re-Examination Clause,
which is inapplicable to a summary judgment entered in advance of a
jury verdict.
It is important, however, to delineate what is not being asserted
in this Article, which is that summary judgment is always
constitutional in all of its application. This has been a common
mistake in the jurisprudence. Both the Supreme Court and
commentators have often assumed that summary judgment is
constitutional in all of its application. On the other hand, Professor
Thomas has famously asserted that summary judgment is always
unconstitutional. This Article rejects both of these broad assertions
while demonstrating that there is some merit to each of these
conflicting views. Summary judgment is constitutional when a court
engages in a confidence analysis. That said, when a judge enters
summary judgment based on a probability analysis, serious Seventh
Amendment concerns arise, and those concerns have yet to be
resolved by the Supreme Court. As such, these arguments are worth
serious consideration.
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